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ABSTRACT
This dissertation includes three approaches we have been designed to tackle threats and challenges in network, software, and mobile security. The first approach demonstrates a new class of
content masking attacks against the Adobe PDF standard, causing documents to appear to humans
dissimilar to the underlying content extracted by information-based services. The second work protects sensitive data in binaries from being corrupted by cyber attackers. The last work proposes
a mechanism which utilizes the unique walking patterns inherent to humans and di↵erentiate our
work from other walking behavior studies by using it as first-order authentication and developing
matching methods fast enough to act as an actual anti-theft system.

vii

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

With an increase in the services on Internet-based systems, a large-scale breach of cybersecurity
is rated as one of the most serious risks facing the world today. By taking advantage of design flaws
in network, software, and mobile security, cyder attackers are able to breach the service system
for large and small organizations in both the public and private sector [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. To discover
and address security threads and vulnerabilities, my research focuses on developing novel security
technologies, particularly against network, mobile, and Linux system. This dissertation presents
multiple approaches to tackle threats and challenges in network, software, and mobile security.
1.1

Adobe PDF Security
Adobe’s Portable Document Format (PDF) has become the standard for electronic documents.

Academic and collegiate papers, business write-ups and fact sheets, advertisements for print, and
anything else meant to be viewed as a final product make use of the PDF standard. Attacks are
studied and corresponding defenses developed dealing with arbitrary code execution through some
allowances made by Adobe to execute JavaScript within the rendering process of a PDF file [6]
[7] or from other rendering vulnerabilities [8] [9]. These typically allow data ex-filtration, botnet creation, or other objectives unrelated to the PDF file itself aside from using it as a delivery
mechanism [10] [11] [12] [13].
In this approach, we present a class of attacks against the content integrity of PDF documents
themselves, and describe a comprehensive defense method against these attacks. Specifically, without changing the appearance of a PDF, we are able to compromise automatic reviewer assignment
systems, such as that used by the IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications
(INFOCOM) [14] that openly publishes its automated algorithm. We also show how an unethical
student can invisibly alter a document to avoid plagiarism detection, namely the dominant market
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share Turnitin [15]. Lastly, we show real-world examples of making leading search engines display
arbitrary (potentially spam, o↵ensive material, etc.) results for innocuous keywords.
1.2

Data Integrity in Linux Binaries
In light of non-control attacks (a.k.a., data-oriented attacks)[16], applications are routinely

shown to be vulnerable to the loss of data security, both in terms of confidentiality and integrity.
By taking advantage of memory corruption vulnerabilities in a program, an attacker is able to
tamper with application-specific data to cause significant damage, such as information leakage [17],
user privilege escalation [18, 16], and arbitrary code execution [17, 19]. The exploited program
under data-oriented attacks follows a legitimate path on its control flow graph (CFG), which makes
the attack difficult to combat even under the state-of-the-art defenses, such as control flow integrity
(CFI), data execution prevention (DEP), and address space layout randomization (ASLR) [20].
Defenses against data-oriented attacks should be tailored to guarantee the integrity of data
in a vulnerable program. Examples of such defenses include data-flow integrity [21], dynamic
taint analysis [22], and SoftBound [23]. Notably, these strategies su↵er from a high performance
overhead without hardware acceleration. This is also because critical data vulnerable to dataoriented attacks can be difficult to identify, which requires application-specific semantic knowledge.
As a result, these schemes require a comprehensive memory safety enforcement to support stronger
policies for all data [24]. In addition, they are all software-level protection approaches and usually
require performing on the source code of a program.
The drawbacks of these protections motivate us to think of feasible defense from both the
software and hardware perspectives. By a comprehensive investigation of published data-only
exploits [18, 17, 16, 24, 20, 25, 26], we summarize that the success of such exploits relies directly or
indirectly on corrupting three types of data: i) conditional branching data, ii) arguments passed to
system or library function calls, and iii) their dependent data. For example, the SSH attack in [17]
needs to corrupt a branching variable, authenticated, to bypass a security check. Control-Flow
Bending [24] relies on corrupting arguments associated with dispatcher functions, which belong to
system or library function calls, to control the return address. Moreover, data-oriented exploits
[16] corrupt gadget dispatchers, which are loop instructions, so as to chain together data-oriented
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gadgets. By protecting these three types of sensitive variables from being corrupted, the threat of
data-oriented attacks can be significantly limited.
Therefore, in this work, we present AutoEnclave, an automatic approach that protects sensitive variables in binaries from being corrupted by data-oriented attacks. Our approach applies
the Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) technology [27] to create memory isolation in a way
such that data-oriented attacks cannot use traditional memory corruption methods to tamper with
sensitive variables. This approach automatically instruments hardware protection features into binaries to protect sensitive variables on Linux. The key procedure in this approach is to efficiently
identify sensitive variables in a given binary that may be vulnerable to data-oriented attacks and
move such data into the SGX enclave for protection.
1.3

Unauthorized Walking Behavior Detection for Mobile Devices
Evolutions in mobile technology have enabled mobile devices to become extensively personal

and valuable items, their loss or theft furthermore compromising important sensitive information.
Advocacy group Consumer Reports writes that 2014 sustained more than 3.1 million instances of
mobile device theft, despite myriad anti-theft measures available for users [28]. These measures all
focus on devices’ retrieval or prevention of information leakage, instead of attempting to make a
timely alert of the actual theft.
In this sense, there are no true anti-theft mechanisms for mobile devices, just damage control
schemes. Accordingly, in this work we develop a means to detect stealing behavior, that is, ongoing
unauthorized movement of a device. Entitled Virtual Safe, we liken it to a physical safe for storing
valuables, as it enables the user to set down a device and restricts other individuals from removing
it without causing alarm. Because a thief has to walk away with a stolen mobile device, we employ
motion pattern, or gait, authentication to verify the identity of the person in possession of the device
immediately whenever it is moved. We designed a detection system for performing authentication
whenever the mobile device is moved, able to notify the owner before a thief escapes. Additionally,
a quick detection method should operate on a limited set of data to reduce the total number of
comparisons necessary. For this reason we work to identify the most representative walking patterns
for a user, those that are strongly matched with the rest of the raw accelerometer data. Through
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construction of an algorithm which compares only the most representative walking patterns using
elementary arithmetic, in lieu of using sophisticated classification tools to classify the whole raw
data, we reduce the processing time to its minimum.
1.4

Dissertation Road-map
The attacks against Adobe PDF are demonstrated in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 details the automatic

approach that protects sensitive variables in binaries from being corrupted by data-oriented attacks.
The anti-theft mechanism for mobile devices is shown in Chapter 4. The text for Chapter 2 and
Chapter 4 is previous published in [29], [30], and [31], respectively.
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CHAPTER 2
CONTENT MASKING ATTACK AGAINST INFORMATION-BASED ONLINE
SERVICES1

2.1

Introduction
Designed as a solution for displaying formatted information consistently on computers with

myriad hardware and software configurations, Adobe’s Portable Document Format (PDF) has
become the standard for electronic documents. Academic and collegiate papers, business write-ups
and fact sheets, advertisements for print, and anything else meant to be viewed as a final product
make use of the PDF standard. Indeed, there is an element of constancy implied in the creation of
a PDF document. End users cannot easily change the text of a PDF document, so most come to
expect a degree of integrity present in all PDF documents encountered.
Attacks are studied and corresponding defenses developed dealing with arbitrary code execution
through some allowances made by Adobe to execute JavaScript within the rendering process of a
PDF file [6] [7] or from other rendering vulnerabilities [8] [9]. These typically allow data exfiltration, botnet creation, or other objectives unrelated to the PDF file itself aside from using it as a
delivery mechanism [10] [11] [12] [13]. We present a class of attacks against the content integrity of
PDF documents themselves, and following this, describe and test a comprehensive defense method
against these attacks. Without changing the appearance of a PDF, we are able to alter how several
information-based services see it, with the following implications:
1. We demonstrate how academic paper writers can collude with multiple conference reviewers,
by altering a paper invisibly to humans, to be assigned to those reviewers by automatic reviewer
assignment systems, such as that used by the IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM) [14] that openly publishes its automated algorithm. We simulate this
1
This chapter was published in USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security), Aug. 2017, [29]. Permission is
included in Appendix A.
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reviewer assignment system using 100 sample academic papers and a corpus of 2094 papers from
114 reviewers of a past security conference, finding that we can cause any of said sample papers to
match with any reviewer.
2. We show how an unethical student can invisibly alter a document to avoid plagiarism
detection, namely the dominant market share Turnitin [15], and generalize methods to target
specific small plagiarism similarity scores to simulate the few false positives such systems typically
detect. We illustrate this attack by inducing plagiarism scores, as measured by Turnitin, from
0-100% in 10 academic papers without changing their appearance.
3. Lastly, we show real-world examples of making leading search engines display arbitrary
(potentially spam, o↵ensive material, etc.) results for innocuous keywords. We have successfully
caused Bing, Yahoo!, and DuckDuckGo to index five documents under keywords not displayed in
those documents.
These systems have in common the need to scrape PDFs for their content for further processing
or searching within. Online conference paper or other document repositories and companies that
index the Internet require text from PDFs so they may be located via search. Natural language processing tools scrape PDFs to discover the topics within, and this information is used in several large
conferences to assign unpublished work to conference reviewers as well as in document repositories
to categorize large volumes of works without manual e↵ort. Finally, plagiarism checkers require
text from new articles for comparison against currently published work to detect impermissible
similarity.
Scraping of PDF documents can be done in an automated setting by text extraction tools
such as the PDFMiner package [32]. However, fonts of any name may be embedded in the PDF
document, and these tools cannot check the fonts’ authenticity. A font is actually akin to an
encoding mechanism, which maps keys pressed on a keyboard to glyphs representing those keys.
Without some way to check the validity of fonts in a PDF, which glyphs a font maps keys to
is arbitrary. Moreover, humans reading a PDF read the rendered version of what a tool such
as PDFMiner reads, meaning that machines and humans are on opposite ends of this encoding
mechanism and may be caused to read di↵erent information.
Consequently, the various PDF document scraping environments may be misused through the
remapping of keys to arbitrary rendered glyphs. Using one or more custom fonts, an attacker may
6

cause a word to be rendered as another word by switching the glyph mapping within the font file,
or rather change the underlying text while keeping a constant rendered output. That is to say, in
a document containing the word “kind” an attacker may force that to be rendered as “mean” with
a custom font mapping k to m, i to e, n to a, and d to n, so the human now sees “mean” while
the machine still sees “kind”; or to avoid human detection an attacker can change the underlying
text to “mean” and use a font with the reverse mapping to render it as “kind” for the human to
see. The latter tactic subverts aforementioned end applications, while still rendering PDFs in all
appearances normal to humans. We refer to this as a content masking attack, as humans are caused
to view a masked version of the content these computer systems read.
To assign papers to reviewers for a conference, several large conferences employ automated
systems to compare the subject paper with a corpus of papers written by each reviewer to find
the best match. This matching is executed upon the most important topics, or keywords, found in
the paper via natural language processing methods. If an author replaces the keywords of a paper
with those of a reviewer’s paper, a high match is guaranteed, and the two may thereby collude.
By creating custom glyph mappings for characters, the masked paper can make perfect sense to
the human eye, while the underlying text read by the machine has many substituted words which
would not make sense to a human reader. This exploit has the technical challenges of replacing
words of di↵ering lengths (larger and smaller replacements require di↵erent methods) and also
constructing multiple fonts required for di↵erent mappings of the same letter (for example, to map
the word “green” to “brown” requires two di↵erent font mappings for e). A naive defense could
check the number of fonts embedded, so in Section 2.4 we design algorithms to minimize the number
of auxiliary fonts used, in order to avoid detection. To evaluate, we construct our own automatic
reviewer assignment system reproducing the current INFOCOM system [14], and show that for 100
test papers, targeting a specific reviewer is possible by masking 4-9 unique words in most papers
and no more than 12 for all tested.
This content masking attack also undermines plagiarism detection. In this case, we need only
switch out isolated characters to change plagiarized text to text never written before, while again
masking these changes as the original text to the human reader. In fact, as most papers have a
small (false positive) percentage of similarity present due to common phrases within the English
language, this method simulates that by varying the number of characters changed, to simulate the
7

usual small but nonzero plagiarism percentage. Only one font is required to make this mapping, as
the resultant text does not need to make sense to the plagiarism detector. Thus, say, all rendered
e’s may be represented by some other letter in a font that maps that key to the glyph e, and other
letters may be changed similarly, building a one-to-one mapping covering at most all letters. The
challenge is to target a small plagiarism percentage, but accomplishing that as we do in Section
2.5, a single embedded font bearing the name of a popular font will cause no suspicion.
Finally, search engines and document repositories may be subverted to display unexpected
content also. Here, we may replace the entire text of a PDF without changing the rendered view,
with a variety of implications. One may hide advertisements in academic papers or business fact
sheets, for example, to spam users searching for information. In this exploit, the attacker should
replace an entire document with the fewest number of fonts necessary, to avoid seeming particularly
unusual. This must be done in a di↵erent way than for the topic matching exploit, due to changing
the entire document rather than a few words, so we outline another method in Section 2.6. We
then test it on popular search engines, finding that Yahoo!, Bing, and DuckDuckGo are susceptible.
Having enumerated these vulnerabilities, as these systems eschew optical character recognition
(OCR) for its overhead, we o↵er a comprehensive and lightweight alternative mitigation method in
Section 2.7. While a naive method would perform OCR over the full document, we instead render
the unique characters used within the document and perform OCR on these. This font verification
method has several technical challenges in its implementation, due to the number and variety of
glyphs within font files, and all these issues are overcome in the algorithm we provide. We find
it performs at a roughly constant speed regardless of document length (a tenth of that for full
document OCR at 10 pages), with glyph distinction accuracy just under 100%, and with 100%
content masking attack detection rate.
2.2

Background Information

2.2.1

PDF Text Extraction

The Adobe PDF standard contains eight basic types of objects, including strings. Strings house
the text in a document, including plain text, octal or hexadecimal representations of plain text,
or text with some type of encoding [33]. PDF rendering software treats each string as a series of
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character identifiers (CIDs), each mapping to its corresponding glyph within the font associated
with that string via the Character Map (CMap) [34]. A series of glyphs is thus displayed.
Text information extracted from PDF files by using tools like the Python package PDFMiner.
These tools extract text by copying the plaintext from all string objects in a PDF file. Though
these tools can extract the font name for each string as well, a whitelist will not defend against this
attack, as fonts may be given any name.
2.2.2

Topic Matching

The exponential growth of human knowledge/record keeping and the ease of its access demands
an efficient means of providing context-relevant search results, stemming the research field of natural
language processing. This field extracts the specific subject of a document without the need for
human classification. The ultimate goal of useful search results prompts the companion research
field of matching keywords to topics which has been tackled by the leading search engines.
Latent Semantic Indexing (LSI) is a popular natural language processing algorithm for extracting topics from documents. The LSI approach infers synonymous words/phrases to be those
with similar surrounding contexts, rather than constructing a thesaurus. These detected patterns
can allow singular value decomposition to reduce the number of important words in a document
such that it may be represented by a small subset. This small subset, of cardinality k, then contains frequency data for each element, such that the document may be represented by a dot in
k-space. Similarity between documents is easily calculated via their Euclidean distances apart in
this geometric representation [35].
Latent Dirichlet Allocation is a newer popular topic extraction algorithm, which is generally
speaking a probabilistic extension of LSI [14]. Topics are generated as collections of related words,
using supervised learning. The probability of a document corresponding to each of the predefined
topics is calculated based on how well the words within the document correspond to the words
within each topic [36, 37].
Topic matching is used within the automation of the review assignment process for several large
conferences, such as the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) or
the IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM). These conferences
receive many submissions and have many reviewers, and the manual task of finding the most suitable
9

reviewers for each paper is onerous, so they automate by comparing topics extracted from subject
papers and papers published by reviewers. The authors of [14] execute a performance comparison
between LSI and LDA for use in the present (as of 2016) INFOCOM reviewer assignment system,
which uses PDFMiner for text extraction, finding LSI to work well with the academic papers
submitted to that conference. We accordingly perform our experiments using LSI to determine the
important keywords of each paper, and note that the attack functions equivalently using LDA.
2.2.3

Plagiarism Detection

Turnitin, LLC has the dominant market share for plagiarism detection software. Its software
is proprietary, but current documentation states “Turnitin will not accept PDF image files, forms,
or portfolios, files that do not contain highlightable text...” [15], indicating that PDFMiner or
some similar internally developed tool is used to scrape the text from PDF documents. We may
assume from the lack of support for image files that optical character recognition (OCR) is not
used, meaning that our proposed attack should succeed, which is proved in Section 2.5.2.
Additionally, the Turnitin documentation states that “All document data must be encoded
using UTF-8 character set” [38]. As mentioned in Section 2.2, text may have custom encodings,
but here we find they are not permitted by Turnitin. This disallows any attack where text, gibberish
in appearance, is translated via decoding into legible text. However, no restriction on fonts is in
place, due to the necessary ability for Turnitin’s client institutions to specify their own format
requirements.
2.2.4

Document Indexing

Extracting topics from a document is somewhat of a subproblem to the larger issue of document
indexing. As information highly relevant to a search may appear in a small portion of a document,
simply relying on the overall topic of every document to infer relevancy to a search may miss some
useful results. A search engine should do more than simply topic modeling to show results for a
query. In fact, Google uses more than 200 metrics to determine search relevancy [39], including its
famous PageRank system of inferring quality of a site based on the number of sites linking to it
[40].
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Though documentation is sparse on other search engines such as Bing or Yahoo, Google does
host some discussion of its treatment of PDF files. It states that they can index “textual content
. . . from PDF files that use various kinds of character encodings” [41] but that aren’t encrypted.
“If the text is embedded as images, we may process the images with OCR algorithms to extract
the text” [41], but for our content masking attack, text is not embedded as images, so logically the
system would not perform OCR. Our experiment finds out for sure for Google, Bing, Yahoo, and
DuckDuckGo in Section 2.6.2.
2.3

Masking Font Creation
The content masking attack is facilitated by the ability to embed custom fonts within PDF

documents. In fact, having all fonts embedded is a formatting requirement for the submission of
academic papers to conferences. However, no integrity check is performed on those fonts as to the
proper correlation between text strings within the PDF file and the respective glyphs rendered in
the PDF viewer. An attacker may map characters to arbitrary glyphs and alter the text extracted
from a PDF document while it appears unchanged to humans in a PDF viewer. This requires two
steps, firstly to create the requisite font files and secondly to encode the text via these font files.
The first step may employ one of the multiple open source multi-platform font editing tools
such as FontForge [42]. With this tool, one can open a font and directly edit the character glyphs
with the typical vector graphics toolbox, or copy the glyph for a character and paste it into the
entry for another character. One can then edit the PDF file directly with open source tools such as
QPDF [43], or in the case of manipulating academic papers, quicken the process by adding custom
fonts in LATEX, and aliasing each to a simple command [44]. We employ the latter method for
its greater ease. It employs the program ttf2tfm, included with LATEX, to convert TrueType fonts
to “TeX font metric” fonts which are usable by LATEX. Two LATEXcode files are supplied by [44]:
T1-WGL4.enc for encoding, and t1custom.fd for easy importing of the font into a LATEXdocument.
The second step of choosing how to mask this content and what in a document to encode with
custom fonts depends on the system targeted, and the technique and evaluation for each of the
three scenarios introduced in Section 2.1 appears in the following three sections.
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2.4

Content Masking Attack Against Conference Reviewer Assignment Systems
As learned in Section 2.2, topic matching works from groups of words constituting the main

topic of the document. Assignment of conference paper submissions to reviewers is accomplished by
finding the highest similarity between detected topics within submissions and those within a corpus
of reviewers’ papers. Meanwhile, a lazy paper writer may wish to collude with specific reviewers,
know of some more generous to papers, or just think reviewers may be less critical of papers not
within their specializations. This lazy writer needs to change the paper topic to target a specific
reviewer, replacing words corresponding to the topic of the paper with words comprising the topic
of a paper from the reviewer’s corpus, while being masked as the original words to still make visual
sense. We now discuss the challenges for this attack and methods to target one or more reviewers,
and subsequently evaluate the attack efficacy.
2.4.1

Construct Word and Character Maps

We primarily require a list of original words within the subject document to change, and a
list of words from the target document to which to change these original words. The new words
will then be masked to display as the original words using the masking fonts described in Section
2.3. First, any stopwords within the document should be eliminated from consideration. These are
common words within the paper’s language, such as “the,” “of,” “her,” or “from.” Stopwords may
be removed by using existing tools like the Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK) Python package [45].
From here an attacker can replace the most frequently used words in the subject paper with the
most frequently used words in the target reviewers paper. This will result in the most frequently
used words in the target paper also appearing in the subject paper, for a high similarity score as
measured by the LSI method within the automatic reviewer assignment system.
Consider word lists A and B having constituent words {a1 , a2 , ..., an } and {b1 , b2 , ..., bn } which
are in descending order of appearance within the subject and target papers, respectively. An
attacker wishes to replace words A with topic B and must therefore replace each word ai within
the text of the subject paper with a word bi , encoded using some font(s) to render bi the same
graphically as ai (a word mapping). No other words should/need be changed. Consequently, the
objective is to construct a mapping between the letters of each bi and ai (a character mapping).
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Figure 2.1: Handling the word length disparity challenge

If ai and bi are character arrays {ai [1], ai [2], ..., ai [pi ]} and {bi [1], bi [2], ..., bi [qi ]}, then the attacker
should construct a masking font such that the character bi [1] maps to the glyph ai [1], bi [2] to ai [2],
etc. We may consider this analogous to a map data structure, where bi [1] is a key and ai [1] its
value, and so on. Two challenges naturally arise in constructing the required character mappings:
2.4.1.1

One-to-Many Character Mapping

From the brief example in Section 2.1 of changing the word green to brown, we know that in
terms of a map data structure there is a collision for the key e and the values o and w, such that
an attacker will require two masking font ”maps” to render green as brown. The first challenge
is to minimize the number of fonts required in the document, so as to avoid suspicion, while fully
switching topic A for B. This problem is not delimited by word: some character mappings may be
reused in the same or other words, and many may not. Additionally, changing all of the words in
A to those in B may be unnecessary, which also impacts the number of one-to-many mappings and
resultant number of required font files. If fewer words must be changed while ensuring the required
similarity between papers, fewer fonts may be required, and a naive font count threshold defense
will be less e↵ective.
2.4.1.2

Word Length Disparity

Further, the lengths pi and qi of words ai and bi may di↵er, causing ai to be longer than bi or
vice versa. If pi > qi , to render bi as ai , a font file entry is necessary for the letter bi [qi ] mapping
to the last pi

qi + 1 letters of ai . Several additional fonts may be necessary if some bi 2 B have
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Algorithm 2.1 Build Character Map
Input: subject paper s, target paper t
Output: character mapping C : B ! A, encoding fonts F = {f1 , f2 , ..., fx }
1: A
top k topic words of LSI(s)
2: B
top k topic words of LSI(t)
3: C
empty character map
4: for i
1 to k do
5:
pi
length(ai )
6:
qi
length(bi )
7:
if pi < qi then
. favorable mapping
8:
for j
1 to pi do
9:
C
C [ {(bi [j], ai [j])}
10:
for j
pi + 1 to qi do
11:
C
C [ {(bi [j], ;)}
12:
else if pi > qi then
. unfavorable mapping
13:
for j
1 to qi 1 do
14:
C
C [ {(bi [j], ai [j])}
15:
rest
combine {ai [qi ], ..., ai [pi ]}
16:
C
C [ {(bi [qi ], rest)}
17:
else
. equal word length
18:
for j
1 to qi do
19:
C
C [ {(bi [j], ai [j])}
20: x
largest number of key collisions in C
21: temp
C
22: for i
1 to x do
. build fonts
23:
fi
empty font
24:
for each c 2 C do
25:
if value in c is ; then
26:
C
C \ {c}
27:
use clearing font for key in c
28:
else if no key collision between c, fi then
29:
C
C \ {c}
30:
fi
fi [ {c}
31:
F
F [ fi
32: C
temp
33: return C, F
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the same last character. Thus, we define a favorable keyword mapping as a word mapping bi ! ai
such that pi < qi . In this case, only a single clearing font is needed, wherein all characters map
to a blank glyph of no width. Figure 2.1 illustrates handling favorable and unfavorable mappings.
In practice, a blank glyph of no width is in fact a single dot, of width (and height) equal to the
smallest unit of measure within a font drawing program. In contrast, an i is 569 units wide (and
a w is 1500 units wide), so this dot will not be rendered at all. And because this clearing font has
all letters map to no-width blanks, it will be the only additional font required if 8i, pi < qi , hence
its favorability.
2.4.2

Matching One or More Papers to One Reviewer

Mapping of words from B to A is by their original descending order of frequency within the
target and subject papers, respectively. Algorithm 2.1 shows the overall encoding process and
begins by running the LSI model on the subject and target papers, then constructing a map
between characters in k of the topic words returned. Then, the mapping is added to C for each
character, for each word of B, to the corresponding character(s) in the corresponding word of A.
Here, comments (Lines 7, 12, 17) indicate the steps taken for favorable and unfavorable mappings
and the case when both words are of the same length. Finally at Line 22, the mappings in C
are broken up into collections to be made into custom masking fonts, with the exception of those
characters from favorable mappings which map to null, for which the previously introduced single
clearing font is used. Resulting from this algorithm are fonts to be used for each character of the
words in B to mask them as the words in A. If the attacker has multiple papers under submission,
this process may be repeated independently for each paper.
2.4.3

Matching One Paper to Multiple Reviewers

For a better chance at cheating the peer review process and to collude with multiple reviewers,
the content masking attack can be adapted to split up the masked words among two (or more)
di↵erent lists of frequently used words. Instead of mapping between word lists A and B, the attacker
will map between A and B and A and C, such that a1 will be replaced with b1 part of the time
and c1 the rest of the time, and so on. The method is otherwise the same as shown in Algorithm
2.1, but has its own challenge.
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Figure 2.2: Similarity scores relative to amount of words masked

1

CDF

0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0

5

10

15

Number of words masked
Figure 2.3: Word masking requirements for all 100 testing papers

Intuition would suggest replacing a1 half of the time with b1 and half of the time with c1 .
However, the requirement for the attacker’s paper to be the most similar of a large number of
papers to a reviewer’s paper and also the most similar of all others to another reviewer’s paper
is quite stringent. The intuitive method fails as the similarity score for one target reviewer will
be high enough but the other too low. So we use an iterative refinement method which tunes the
replacement percentages according to the calculated similarity scores until they are both the highest
among their peers. This is generalizable to more than two reviewers, by refining the percentages
proportionally according to the successive di↵erences in similarity scores between the subject paper
and each of the target papers. We match one paper to three reviewers in Section 2.4.4, the typical
number of reviewers to which papers are assigned (barring contention in reviews, which would not
happen during collusion).
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Figure 2.4: Masking font requirements for all 100 testing papers

2.4.4

Experiment

We have built a conference simulation system reproducing the INFOCOM automatic assignment
process described in [14]. We imported into this system 114 TPC members from a well-known
recent security conference as reviewers, and downloaded a collection of each of these reviewers’
papers published in recent years. In total, this comprised 2094 papers used as training data for the
automatic reviewer assignment system. For testing data, we also downloaded 100 papers published
in the greater Computer Science field. Our experiment, then, is to test the topic matching of the
test papers with the training papers, via our content masking attack. Following are evaluations of
the content masking attack matching one paper to one reviewer, multiple papers to one reviewer,
and one paper to multiple reviewers.
The automatic reviewer assignment process compares a subject paper with every paper from
the collection of reviewers’ papers to gather a list of similarity scores. The reviewer with the highest
similarity score is assigned the paper to judge (if available). We therefore aim to change a testing
paper topic to a training paper topic, and to examine how well this works with all papers. For
each such pair of papers, then, we replace the frequently appearing words A in the testing paper
with those frequently appearing words B in the training paper via Algorithm 2.1. We test the
topic matching of each of the 100 testing papers against our training data to see what is required
to induce a match.
For each pair of training and testing papers, we replace important words in the testing paper
one by one, to see how many replacements are needed to make that pair the most similar. Figure
17

2.2 illustrates this iterative process for one example training/testing paper pair, showing resultant
similarity scores. The box plots show where the greatest concentration of the 2094 similarity scores
dwell, while red pluses show outliers. The blue stars which emerge to the top correspond to the
similarity scores between the testing paper and the target training paper. Figure 2.2 shows a clear
separation of that similarity score from the rest after replacing 9 words, meaning that for this pair,
content masking all appearances of those 9 unique words in the testing paper will result in its
assignment to the reviewer who wrote that training paper.
Performing this process for all 100 testing papers, we compile the results into Figure 2.3, which
displays the cumulative distribution function (CDF) for the number of words requiring replacement.
Evidently, all 100 papers may be matched with the target with 12 words or fewer masked. The
sharp jump appearing from 4-9 words indicates that most papers can be successfully targeted to a
specific reviewer masking between 4 and 9 words. The font requirements for replacing these words
is then represented in Figure 2.4. A majority of papers require 3 or fewer masking fonts, while
almost all of them need only as many as 5. This is a comparatively small number and should go
unnoticed among the collection of fonts natural to academic papers.
Should an author wish to have multiple submitted papers all assigned to a target reviewer, the
author may simply repeat the content masking process on each paper. While in the previous case
we find that an average of 3 or 4 fonts is necessary to make a single test paper sufficiently similar to
the target training paper, that needs not directly translate to 3 or 4 fonts per paper with multiple
papers. Some fonts may be reused among papers, resulting in fewer overall fonts used. Figure 2.5
confirms this, showing a trend more logarithmic than linear.
Finally, we evaluate the iterative refinement method to split masked words among three reviewers’ papers as discussed in Section 2.4.3. Figure 2.6 shows that the similarity scores for the three
target reviewers (blue star, black circle, and green triangle) consistently increase; after some 70
words masked, the subject paper is more similar to the three target papers than any others.
2.5

Content Masking Attack Against Plagiarism Detection
While a method similar to the topic matching subversion technique just outlined may be used to

hide plagiarism, fewer requirements constrain the plagiarist than the lazy author targeting a specific
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reviewer in a conference. Specifically, an attacker needs only make the underlying text di↵erent
than the rendered, plagiarized text. The underlying text does not need to be actual words, and so
only one font is needed, ensuring the naive defense of limiting fonts is defeated. This scrambling font
is just a random scrambling of the characters. Each original letter is replaced with the letter which
displays as the original. Resulting is a human-legible PDF document which appears as gibberish
to Turnitin and necessarily has a similarity score of 0%. Details and options for this method are
below, followed by an evaluation of each option.
2.5.1

Targeting a Specific Plagiarism Score

Because Turnitin is a similarity checker, not a plagiarism detector, it relies on the human factor
to actually detect plagiarism. Turnitin informs the individual with grading duties of any pieces of
similar prose, which naturally arise due to the plethora of written work in existence and the human
tendency toward common patterns and figures of speech. It is unlikely then, and would stand out
to the grader, that a submission would have 0% similarity with anything ever written. We o↵er
and evaluate two methods an attacker can use to target a specific (low but non-zero) similarity
score and more likely go unnoticed.
The first method is by letter. Here, the attacker begins with a scrambling font and removes
characters from being scrambled successively until a target percentage of the text is not being
replaced. Intuitively, this small target percentage would then appear plagiarized, yielding a credible
similarity score. This may be done in a calculated fashion using the known frequency of usage of
letters in the English (or other) language. The letters may be listed by their frequency in ascending
or descending order (we evaluate both) and then excluded from scrambling in that order until the
target percentage of unaltered text is reached.
The second method is by word. This method is similar to the previous, but instead of leaving
some characters unscrambled in the custom font, the attacker leaves some words unaltered by not
applying the custom scrambling font to them. Here, words within the document may be listed in
frequency of appearance, ascending or descending, and excluded from the scrambling font in that
order (we again evaluate both). We also consider changing words at random with a probability
targeting some similarity score. This method may be more e↵ective for an attacker in the long
run, if Turnitin implements a requirement that some percentage of words be found in a dictionary,
20
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Figure 2.7: E↵ects of the percentage of text changed upon plagiarism similarity scores for 10 sample
documents

English or otherwise. In that case, this attack may be augmented by the previously described
method of replacing real words for other real words rendered as the originals.
2.5.2

Experiment

We use 10 already published papers retrieved from the Internet and mask the content in varying
degrees to see the e↵ects on Turnitin’s returned similarity scores. We vary the amount a scrambling
font is applied to the text according to the previously described methods and upload the resultant
papers to Turnitin. Again, we target a specific range of similarity scores, between 5% and 15%,
such that a human grader is unlikely to suspect foul play.
Figure 2.7 plots the three methods. “Frequency descending” refers to the method of masking
words in the order of their frequency of appearance in the document, while “Letter usage descending” refers to masking letters by their frequency of usage. Ascending order proved unwieldy in
both cases and not worth displaying. Finally, “Random replacement” refers to the method of iterating over all words and masking them with a probability of 1-100% in increments of 1%. These
are all plotted in terms of the percentage of text changed. Masking letters by their frequency of
usage results in a similarity curve that is too steep to be manageable for selecting a small range
of similarity scores. In contrast, the other two methods are very suitable for comfortably picking
a specific range. Any probability between 17% and 20% will net a similarity score in our desired
5-15% range in the case of randomly chosen masking. When words are replaced in order of their
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Figure 2.8: Results of the content masking attack on search engines

frequency of appearance, the 5-15% range may be achieved by replacing anywhere between 20 and
40% of the words, o↵ering a very wide range of safety for the plagiarist.
2.6

Document Indexing Subversion
The final direction of this attack is against search engines, whether for the entire web or for

small document repositories or websites. Websites can implement a simple search returning pages
housing the query text, or they can use custom search engines o↵ered by Google [46] or Yahoo!
[47]. Microsoft Bing also o↵ers its API [48]. As small sites are unlikely to have a more sophisticated
search mechanism than the leading search engines, we target and demonstrate our attack against
these.
2.6.1

Method

We here consider modifying the entire content of a PDF to render as something else. Both the
underlying text extracted by PDFMiner (or otherwise) and the rendered text should make sense
in this case, so that an individual searching for certain terms will be caused to find a PDF holding
those words but displaying something entirely di↵erent. This results in a more extreme version of
the one-to-many character mapping challenge from the attack against topic matching. Instead of
masking a small finite number of words, we now examine masking the entire content. However,
this is facilitated by the realization that these masks are not necessarily delineated by spaces as
before; the attacker can treat the entire document as a single word to be masked. It consequently
encounters the word length disparity challenge, to treat the variation in length between real and
rendered text, but only once.
Nevertheless, the strategy of adding new fonts, ad hoc, to cover each new mapping quickly
balloons out of control, in terms of the attacker needing to keep track of what mappings appear
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in what font. The number of fonts will increase with the number of characters to be masked, to
an upper limit of every character needing a map to every other. Considering (for English) upper
and lower case letters, numbers, and common punctuation (22 symbols, dependent upon count),
all 26 + 26 + 10 + 22 = 84 characters must each map to the other 83 di↵erent characters, as well
as themselves for those cases which a character and its mask are the same. This requires 84 fonts
and represents 842 = 7056 mappings. Code can certainly be written to automatically construct all
these mappings, but to make this more efficient, we o↵er an alternative - 84 fonts, in each of which
all characters map to one masking character. For example, in font “MaskAsA” character a maps
to a, b to a, 4 to a, ! to a, etc. To mask a document as another, the attacker may simply apply
fonts, character by character, that correspond to the desired mask. At the end of the documents,
the three end behavior options presented as part of Algorithm 2.1 and illustrated in Figure 2.1
function here as well, to handle the length variation.
2.6.2

Experiment

To demonstrate the efficacy of this attack, we obtained a handful of well-known academic papers,
masked their content, and then placed them on one author’s university website to be indexed by
several leading search engines. For this simple proof of attack, we only used one masking font
which scrambled the letters for rendering. The resulting papers have legible text that renders to
gibberish, meaning that if they can be located by searching for that legible text, the search engine
is fooled.
We submitted the site housing these papers to Google, Bing, and Yahoo! and searched for them
some days later. Search engine DuckDuckGo does not accept website submissions but we searched
there as well. Figure 2.8 lists the results of our content masking attack on these search engines.
“Indexed Papers” indicates the search engine listed the papers in its index. “Attack Successful”
means they are indexed using the underlying text, not the rendered gibberish. After a successful
attack, the papers may later be put behind a spam warning or removed from the index, as shown in
the last two columns. We found similar results for each of the 5 papers tested: that Bing, Yahoo!,
and DuckDuckGo all indexed the papers according to the masked legible text, and none removed
them later (at time of writing). Yahoo! did mark them as spam after two days but confusingly
some days after that removed the spam warning.
23

Figure 2.9: Results of the content masking attack against popular search engines

24

Figure 2.9 illustrates this for one of tested paper. The masked paper is shown in part (a) of
Figure 2.9 and contains no rendered English words beyond what is shown. Part (b), part (c),
part (d) of Figures 2.9 show the search results for the legible underlying text, and Part (e) of
Figure 2.9 shows the spam warning appearing days later but later disappearing. Each query was
appended with “site:XXX.edu” to isolate the university website where they are hosted for this proof
of concept.
Interestingly, Google indexed the papers, but according to the rendered gibberish, not the
underlying text. This indicates, of these four engines, only it performs OCR on PDF files it indexes
rather than extracting the text through PDFMiner or the like. After two days, the papers were
removed from Google’s index, before the authors obtained screenshots. We conclude that Google
has a robust defense against the content masking attack, while the other three engines remain
susceptible.
2.7

Defense Against Content Masking
As intoned through this paper, Optical Character Recognition (OCR) is able to move the

text extraction process from targeting the underlying text to the rendered version, preventing this
masking attack. OCR is required for print documents scanned to PDF, but for documents with
rendered text, system designers have been loath to use OCR in lieu of PDFMiner or its ilk. OCR
is far more complex and requires more processing time than simply running the PDF file through
a lightweight parser to collect its strings. We propose here a lightweight font verification method
that enables the use of OCR in a highly efficient way to prevent the content masking attack. The
intuition is simple; we render each character in the fonts embedded in the subject PDF file and then
perform OCR on those characters rather than the rendered PDF file itself. Where an academic
paper may be some 50,-75,000 characters, the fonts embedded therein usually contain at most just
a couple hundred characters.
2.7.1

Challenges and Technical Details

While the intuition is simple, some challenges arise in its realization. First, while most PDF
generation tools will embed only those letters used in the document, it is possible through Adobe
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InDesign, as one example, to embed the whole font. Some fonts accommodate many characters used
in many other languages, and the upper limit on font character capacity is 216 = 65, 536 because
characters have a two-byte index. Clearly, performing OCR on a font of that size will be equivalent
to performing OCR on an academic paper in terms of computational overhead. Consequently,
we scan the document to extract the characters used, and only render those characters (in their
respective fonts) for OCR verification. This requires iterating over the entire document, but the
overhead introduced here is much less than with full-document OCR, as the process just builds
a list from the series of character codes rather than executing image processing techniques on all
character glyphs. OCR is then performed on the series of character codes used in each font only.
Second, the existence of many special characters within a font prompts the question of what
characters OCR can distinguish and how to handle those it can’t. Theoretically, OCR may mature
to the point where it can distinguish any sort of accent mark over normal letters, any characters
used in languages other than English, and any additional special characters used in typeset mathematics, etc., and some OCR software may be currently in development working on a subset of these
problems. However, we aim to provide a defense method readily integrable into current systems.
Additionally, such an advanced software will likely incur overhead beyond that of a current OCR
package to achieve the requisite precision, where our solution must be sufficiently lightweight to fit
within systems where full-document OCR has not been applied due to computational complexity.
We define a normal set of character codes as those representing upper and lowercase English letters,
numbers, and common punctuation, which English OCR packages target, and then we check if the
extracted character codes appear in this normal set or not. A letter in the normal set appearing
as something other than itself is evidence of the content masking attack, as is a letter outside the
normal set having the glyph of one inside. OCR is performed on all used characters in the font, as
previously mentioned, and those within the normal set are required to have the correct respective
glyph, while those outside the normal set are constrained not to have a distinguishable glyph (i.e.
one appearing in the normal set).
The third issue arises with the fact that many special characters have high similarity with
normal characters, especially for those fonts in common use which have many thousands of available
characters. If one such special character is used legitimately in the text, the scheme just described
will flag it as a content masking attack due to its similar appearance with a normal set character.
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Worse, common OCR tools available presently will conflate characters which humans can easily
tell apart but for which the software is not precise enough to do so. For example, it is easy to tell
visually that ⇡ and n are di↵erent characters, but not by common OCR tools.
2.7.2

Font Training Step

We therefore introduce a training step, wherein OCR is performed on the font and lists of
intersections compiled. When we perform OCR on each represented character and the detected
glyph for a special character but appears like a normal letter, we check the list of characters similar
to that normal letter. If the special character appears on that list, we recognize that it may be valid
and that we cannot know if it is being used legitimately or as part of a content masking attack. As
the purpose of the content masking attack is to disguise the visually rendered text as some other
text for the computer to see, we simply replace the extracted character code for this letter as the
normal letter it looks like, and pass this on to the end application. If content masking is occurring,
the rendered text is sent to the plagiarism detector, reviewer assignment system, etc., thwarting the
attack. Otherwise, the string in which this special character appears is with high probability not an
English word and would not be useful to the end application anyway. A reviewer assignment system
or plagiarism detector will not make use of mathematical equations when assigning reviewers, as
these are not discernible words, so if ⇡r2 is extracted as nrz , no loss of function is su↵ered.
This training solution prompts one further issue, which is that di↵erent fonts will need to be
trained independently as their nuances cause di↵erent sets of characters to appear similar. For the
reviewer assignment and plagiarism detection problems, we know a limited number of fonts should
be used, due to academic formatting requirements favoring a small set of fonts. Nevertheless, for
other applications, such as search indexing, the only limit on the number of fonts that can be
trained is that those fonts must be legible enough for an OCR tool to parse. These lists do not
occupy too much space; for example our lists for Times New Roman and Arial fonts are 29.4KB and
36.2KB, respectively. This database compiled, the OCR tool will be used to discern the real name
of each font used in the document, to counteract the problem mentioned early in this chapter, that
an attacker may name a font anything desired. Open source OCR tools such as Tesseract OCR
[49] provide this functionality.
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2.7.3

Font Verification Overview

The training process begins by gathering a collection of fonts and training the system on each.
For each character in a font’s normal set, all special characters are tested for OCR similarity, and
any identified as similar are added to the list for that normal character. Testing a new PDF file
is outlined in Algorithm 2.2, wherein the list of characters and their fonts is reduced to unique
combinations of those attributes, and each then tested with OCR. Content masking attacks are
detected in lines 12 and 17 when the underlying character index is a normal character other than the
OCR-extracted character or when the underlying character index is a special character that does
not appear in the similarity list for the OCR-extracted character. In these cases, this pseudocode
exits to notify of the attack, though other behavior could be inserted here. This protects all
end applications, except in the attack against plagiarism detection in which the attacker replaces
normal characters with special characters similar in appearance. That specific attack is identified
as possible at line 15, in the case that the underlying character is a special character which does
appear in the similarity list for the OCR-extracted character; in this case all instances of this
character in the text extracted from this file are replaced with the OCR-extracted character for use
in the end application.
2.7.4

Font Verification Performance

The implementation for this defense method is written in Python and employs PDF-Extract
[50] to extract font files from PDFs, textract [51] to extract the text strings, and pytesseract [52],
a Python wrapper for Tesseract OCR [49]. The alternative to our font verification method is to
perform OCR on the entire document, so we use Tesseract OCR for this purpose also for a fair
comparison. This comparison will illustrate not only that our method detects/mitigates the content
masking attack as well as the naive full document OCR method, but that it performs far better in
several scenarios common to PDFs both in and out of the presence of our content masking attack.
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Algorithm 2.2 Extract Rendered Text
Input: font list F = {f1 , f2 , ..., fp }, normal character index set N = {n1 , n2 , ..., nq }, special character index set S = {s1 , s2 , ..., sr }, document character list D = {d1 , d2 , ..., ds }
Output: extracted text T = {t1 , t2 , ..., ts }
1:

Unique character index/font map list U = ;

2:

for i

1 to s do

if di 2
/ U then

3:

U [ (di , FONT(di ))

U

4:

|U |

5:

m

6:

OCR-extracted character index set O = {o1 , o2 , ..., om }

7:

for i

8:

oi

OCR(ui )

9:

f

ui .f ont

10:

L

list of similar character lists {l1 , l2 , ..., lv } for f

11:

if ui .index 2 N then

1 to m do

if oi 6= ui .index then

12:

. Attack Detected

break

13:

else if ui .index 2 S then

14:

if ui .index 2 loi then

15:

ui

16:

. Attack Possible

oi

else

17:

. Attack Detected

break

18:
19:

T

Apply modified U to D

20:

return T

First, we compare the performance of the two methods with di↵ering amounts of masked content.
We generate 10 PDF files with masked characters varying from 5-20% in frequency of appearance,
and apply both methods to each of these file. The results are shown in Figure 2.10 and show a
distinct benefit to our font verification method compared with the traditional full document OCR.
Here, detection rate refers to the correct extraction of rendered text and the consequent ability to
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prevent the content masking attack from occurring. For full document OCR, we generate 10 PDF
documents with no content masking and measure the error in character recognition, and then we
use this error as a threshold, such that the attack is flagged for one of the content masked PDF files
if it is determined to have a larger di↵erence between characters and their glyphs. That threshold
was measured at 7%, and more than 20% of characters had to be masked before the full document
OCR method detected the content masking attack (after this, detection was 100%). The attack
is considered detected by the font verification method if Algorithm 2.2 flags it or the edge case
approach we take of replacing special characters that look like normal letters with those normal
letters will enable the end application (plagiarism/spam detector) to process the text properly and
thereby flag the attack. In all cases, our algorithm detected the attack or constructed the proper
English words required by the end application to detect it.
The disparity here between the methods’ accuracy in the 5-20% character masking range has
a few aspects involved. Fewer masked characters will appear in a sparser distribution, which make
them less visible among legitimate characters. OCR is a↵ected by the distance between characters
and the resolution of the image, among other things, which we can control in the case of font
verification but which are not controlled when performing OCR over an entire document. We can
generate an optimal image of all relevant characters, check their validity, flag detected attacks, and
in the case of special characters which appear identical to normal letters, replace them with those
normal letters for proper use in the end application.
We also analyze the e↵ects of document length on the detection rate for each method, by
comparing their results on 10 PDF files ranging from 1-10 pages in length and having an even
30% distribution of masked characters. Figure 2.11 illustrates that while the font verification
method is almost perfectly static, full document OCR gradually performs more poorly, reaching
14% misdetection by page 10. The aforementioned OCR error rate explains this problem, where
while 30% masked characters is above the required 20% to guarantee detection in the previous
experiment, additional pages of text steadily allow more masked text to go unnoticed. The font
verification appears to be 100% throughout, but actually dips to 99.8% halfway through. Our
method is not immune to the errors inherent to OCR as it also uses OCR, but its more judicious
approach minimizes those errors. In this case, OCR is confusing the ’;’ and ’:’ characters; these
are rare but eventual in prose.
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Finally, we demonstrate the performance gain of our font verification method over the full
document OCR method, on 20 PDF files ranging from 1-20 pages in length and having a 30%
distribution of masked characters. In Figure 2.12, the full document OCR method increases linearly
with pages added while the font verification method unsurprisingly remains largely static, increasing
by roughly a second compared to the 45 experienced by the full document OCR method. In all, our
method requires about 6 seconds to check a 20 page document, rather than 50 seconds, using one
core on a laptop processor (Intel i7 at 2.7GHz). This provides far better scalability for the target
systems than the alternative, and is easily applied to current systems without requiring upgrades.
2.8

Related Work
Most exploit research targeting the PDF standard has been in bugs surrounding various pro-

grams rendering, displaying, exporting, or otherwise handling PDF documents. The not-for-profit
MITRE Corporation lists in its Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) collection 431 entries involving the keyword “PDF” and having to do with these external programs [10]. These
allow for arbitrary code execution on the host computer and all the associated security risks [11],
including establishment of botnets, data exfiltration, and other high-impact security issues. They
are, however, limited to basic hacking-type exploits, zero-days chased by patches, and the PDF
itself is essentially a vehicle for the hack [12]. These attacks are not thematically novel, and the
patches indeed follow the zero-days with reasonable speed [13].
Similarly, some exploration has been performed on the JavaScript execution ability within the
PDF standard. When abused, this too allows for arbitrary code execution. Security researcher
Didier Stevens o↵ers a series of blogs discussing how to misuse this JavaScript execution, including
how to encode the strings involved to create polymorphic malware resisting simple signature-based
antivirus products [53]. Some research finds that writing polyglots (code valid in multiple languages) within PDFs can expose security concerns depending on what language the reader uses to
interpret the code [7]. Successive updates to the PDF standard implement measures to block certain
functions, such as reaching out to the Internet, placing their function behind a confirmation window
for the user to view [33]. Additionally, most current antivirus products o↵er real-time protection
using heuristics that can detect potentially malicious behaviors despite simple code obfuscation.
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Some academic research regarding PDF security analyzes the JavaScript being executed to verify
safety. One work analyzes a set of static features extracted from the PDF, and then instruments
with context monitoring code the JavaScript within. This combination static and runtime approach
is tested on a collection of 18623 PDF documents without malware and 7370 with, resulting in
few false negatives and no false positives [6]. Other research targets attacks not dependent on
JavaScript or other parsing vulnerabilities, including one that works to detect these attacks using
machine learning on existing flagged PDF files using data extracted from the structure of the file as
well as its content [8]. One may expect this strategy to su↵er from the same difficulties experienced
by signature-based antivirus products, namely an inability to detect malware not already discovered
by researchers. Another work allows PDF documents to be opened in an emulated environment to
track how they behave before doing so in the host environment [9].
Some works slightly closer to ours examine the possibility of causing PDF documents to be
rendered di↵erently on di↵erent computers, showing how to restrict the syntax of the PDF standard
to prevent this from occurring [54] [55]. This attack against data consistency has some vague
similarity to the concept of content masking - displaying di↵erent content for the human than the
machine. However, we provide several real-world examples of how our content masking attack
can subvert real systems, while the impact of the attack in this work is relatively limited to the
document looking di↵erent to humans using di↵erent computers. Some works [56] [57] [58] examine
poisoning search results, but this is from the perspective of presenting false data to the machine
through website code or manipulations of the PageRank algorithm via botnets, an existing threat
vector for which defenses have been continually adapting.
Section 2.2 introduces the Character Map (CMap), through which letters are mapped to entries
within fonts, ultimately displaying the associated glyphs. During our literature search, we found
a work [34] from a social science journal of Assessment & Evaluation in Higher Education which
touches on a similar topic from a non-scientific stance. [34] discusses how the CMap can be altered
to make letters map to di↵erent characters within a font. In this way, plagiarism detection can be
fooled by mapping to obscure characters whose glyphs are similar in appearance to those for the
typically used characters. After devising our attacks, we discovered this work also contains cursory
mention of the ability to modify the glyphs within a font, but does not explore this possibility or
demonstrate its practicality as we do. We evaluate new methods to target specific similarity scores
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such that the resultant PDF does not appear unnatural with a 0% similarity score. Further, we
show how these custom fonts can be used to subvert conference reviewer-assignment systems and
search indexing, developing new and distinct attack methods specific to each of these very di↵erent
targets. Additionally, we provide a robust defense method, including a defense against the slightly
di↵erent attack proposed in [34] involving the use of existing characters similar in appearance to
normal letters.
2.9

Conclusion
In this work, we have presented a new class of content masking attacks against the Adobe PDF

standard. After creating algorithms for each of three content masking attack variants, we perform a comprehensive evaluation showing that each lives up to its theory and operates in present
state-of-the-art systems. Our first attack allows academic paper writers and reviewers to collude
via subverting the automatic reviewer assignment systems in current use by academic conferences
including INFOCOM, which we simulated. This requires no visible changes to the paper being
reviewed and the addition of just 3-5 custom masking fonts for almost all of the 100 papers tested,
easily lost in any paper’s natural fonts. We show a second attack that renders ine↵ective plagiarism detection software, particularly Turnitin, to the point of being able to target specific small
plagiarism similarity scores to appear natural and evade detection. In our final attack, we successfully place masked content into the indexes for Bing, Yahoo!, and DuckDuckGo which renders as
information entirely di↵erent from the keywords used to locate it. Lastly, we provide and test a
robust font verification algorithm which is more accurate than full document OCR and requires
considerably less computation power.
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CHAPTER 3
AUTOMATING PROTECTION OF SENSITIVE VARIABLE SECURITY IN
BINARIES BASED ON SGX ENCLAVE

3.1

Introduction
In light of non-control attacks (a.k.a., data-oriented attacks)[16], applications are routinely

shown to be vulnerable to the loss of data security, both in terms of confidentiality and integrity.
By taking advantage of memory corruption vulnerabilities in a program, an attacker is able to
tamper with application-specific data to cause significant damage, such as information leakage [17],
user privilege escalation [18, 16], and arbitrary code execution [17, 19]. The exploited program
under data-oriented attacks follows a legitimate path on its control flow graph (CFG), which makes
the attack difficult to combat even under the state-of-the-art defenses, such as control flow integrity
(CFI), data execution prevention (DEP), and address space layout randomization (ASLR) [20].
Defenses against data-oriented attacks should be tailored to guarantee the integrity of data
in a vulnerable program. Examples of such defenses include data-flow integrity [21], dynamic
taint analysis [22], and SoftBound [23]. Notably, these strategies su↵er from a high performance
overhead without hardware acceleration. This is also because critical data vulnerable to dataoriented attacks can be difficult to identify, which requires application-specific semantic knowledge.
As a result, these schemes require a comprehensive memory safety enforcement to support stronger
policies for all data [24]. In addition, they are all software-level protection approaches and usually
require performing on the source code of a program.
The drawbacks of these protections motivate us to think of feasible defense from both the
software and hardware perspectives. By a comprehensive investigation of published data-only
exploits [18, 17, 16, 24, 20, 25], we summarize that the success of such exploits relies directly or
indirectly on corrupting three types of data: i) conditional branching data, ii) arguments passed to
system or library function calls, and iii) their dependent data. For example, the SSH attack in [17]
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needs to corrupt a branching variable, authenticated, to bypass a security check. Control-Flow
Bending [24] relies on corrupting arguments associated with dispatcher functions, which belong to
system or library function calls, to control the return address. Moreover, data-oriented exploits
[16] corrupt gadget dispatchers, which are loop instructions, so as to chain together data-oriented
gadgets. By protecting these three types of sensitive variables from being corrupted, the threat of
data-oriented attacks can be significantly limited. Therefore, this work focuses on the protection
of these types of sensitive data, while our approach can be extended and applied to other sensitive
in-memory data in general.
We present AutoEnclave, an automatic approach that protects sensitive variables in binaries
from being corrupted by data-oriented attacks. Our approach applies the Intel Software Guard
Extensions (SGX) technology [27] to create memory isolation in a way such that data-oriented
attacks cannot use traditional memory corruption methods to tamper with sensitive variables. This
approach automatically instruments hardware protection features into binaries to protect sensitive
variables on Linux. The key procedure in this approach is to efficiently identify sensitive variables
in a given binary that may be vulnerable to data-oriented attacks and move such data into the
SGX enclave for protection. To evaluate AutoEnclave, we use it to enforce Intel SGX enclave
protection on a set of benchmarks. The evaluation results demonstrate that AutoEnclave can
efficiently guarantee the integrity of sensitive variables. The run-time overhead for SPEC CPU
2006 [59] a 128% on average.
3.2

Motivation and System Overview
In this section, we briefly introduce the background and our motivation of protecting sensitive

variables to defend against data-oriented attacks, and then present an overview of AutoEnclave.
3.2.1

Data-oriented Attacks

Traditional control data attacks tamper with a program’s control data (e.g., return addresses
or function pointers) to hijack or redirect the target program’s control flow [17]. By contrast,
data-oriented attacks corrupt only data, but not any code pointers. These attacks also follow a
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Figure 3.1: Vulnerable code snippet

legitimate path on the program’s CFG, which makes existing control-related defenses ine↵ective
[20].
Code 3.1 shows a typical example of data-oriented attacks. The code is abstracted from a
vulnerability in SSH [60] that can be exploited to launch a user privilege escalation attack. In this
example, the HandlePacket function on line 4 does not check the length of packet and can be used
to write more than 1000 bytes to packet when it receives a packet from the network. By utilizing
this exploit, an attacker is able to overwrite the authenticated variable to bypass the conditional
check on line 5 and get the packet processed.
3.2.2

Leveraging Hardware Features to Protect Sensitive Variables

Most software-level defenses [61, 62, 23] require a comprehensive memory safety enforcement to
guarantee the integrity of critical data, which can incur a high performance overhead. Meanwhile,
they need the knowledge of a program’s source code to adopt the protection against data-oriented
attacks. This motivates us to design an e↵ective protection of sensitive variables to defense against
data-oriented attacks from the hardware perspective.
Intel SGX [27] is a set of CPU instructions that can create private regions (called enclaves) of
code and data for user applications, which makes it an ideal solution to guarantee the integrity
of sensitive variables by creating hardware-level memory isolation. Our tool AutoEnclave is
designed to automatically instrument SGX code into binaries to protect sensitive variables against
data-oriented attacks. The evident advantage of AutoEnclave is that a program’s source code
is not needed compared with most existing defenses. In addition, directly working with binaries is
easier and more efficient to overcome compliance issues, thus reducing uncertainty when deploying
code instrumentation [63].
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Figure 3.2: Vulnerable assembly code snippet

Considering the previous example for protection based on SGX code instrumentation: in order
to bypass the authentication and process the packet, an attacker can corrupt the authenticated
variable in Figure 3.1 by exploiting the bu↵er overflow vulnerability in HandlePacket. This example’s assembly code is shown in Figure 3.2, which indicates that the authenticated variable
is at -0x3f4(%rbp), and the packet variable starts from -0x3f0(%rbp) in the binary. If we can
identify -0x3f4(%rbp) as conditional branching data, we can protect it from being corrupted by
sending this variable into the SGX enclave. Apparently, we must also change the read/write code
associated with -0x3f4(%rbp), such as lines 1 and 13 in Figure 3.2, to ensure that the binary program still runs correctly. Although it is not difficult to identify the sensitive variables by manually
analyzing this simplified example in Figure 3.2, real-world programs can be much more complex.
AutoEnclave automates the process of sensitive variables identification for real-world scenarios.
3.2.3

AutoEnclave

AutoEnclave is an automated tool that can search for sensitive variables in binaries and instrument SGX-enabled protection of such data. The architecture of AutoEnclave is illustrated in
Figure 3.3. There are three main modules in AutoEnclave: i) the analysis module, ii) the sensitive
variable identification module, and iii) the instrumentation module.
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Figure 3.3: System architecture of AutoEnclave

As shown in Figure 3.3, AutoEnclave first analyzes a target binary and constructs its basic
blocks, CFG and data flow graph (DFG) in the analysis module. Then, sensitive variables which
are vulnerable to data-oriented attacks are identified in the identification module. Next, the instrumentation module instruments the target binary to move identified data into the SGX enclave
for protection. This module also creates the enclave-related code to store and operate the sensitive
variables.
3.3

Sensitive Variable Identification
The analysis module in AutoEnclave takes a binary as the input and leverages an existing

method [64] to generate basic blocks, the CFG, and the DFG of the target binary. Then, the
identification module analyzes assembly code to identify sensitive variables. In this section, we first
define such data in binaries and then present our identification algorithm.
3.3.1

Sensitive Variable Definition

One of the key points in our approach is to identify sensitive variables that are vulnerable to
memory corruption attacks in binaries. In order to limit the cost of communications between the
binary and the enclave, the set of sensitive variables should be as small as possible but still cover
data that can be vulnerable to data-oriented attacks. Based on our investigation of exiting attack
strategies [18, 17, 16, 24, 20, 25], we focus on three types of sensitive variables: i) conditional
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branching data, ii) parameters passed to system and library function calls, and iii) their dependent
data.

Figure 3.4: An example of data-oriented attacks by corrupting system call parameters

3.3.1.1

Conditional Branching Data

Branch instructions are treated as a lifeline of a program, since they decide the program execution path according to the variety of conditional branching data. One of the most powerful
data-oriented attacks is designed to corrupt conditional branching data or variables associated
with them so as to redirect the program’s control flow to arbitrary locations. Code 3.1 is an example of a privilege escalation attack, which corrupts the conditional variable authenticate to
authorize the received packet. Thus, isolating such data in a safer place will significantly reduce
the risk of data-oriented attacks.
3.3.1.2

Parameters Passed to System and Library Function Calls

Another type of sensitive variables is parameters passed to system and library function calls.
System calls, such as setuid and sys fchown, are provided by the kernel to manage the system/hardware resources. Library function calls, such as printf and strcpy, are also indispensable
to process necessary demands of applications and users. Corrupting the content of those arguments
can lead to serious damage, such as privilege escalation and information leakage. Code 3.4 demonstrates a working exploit modeled from the WU-FTPD server code [17]. In the exploit, by making
use of a format string error, an attacker can tamper the parameter pw->pw uid in the setuid
system call to escalate the user privilege.
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3.3.1.3

Dependent Data

Only isolating conditional branching data and function arguments is not enough to guarantee
the integrity of sensitive variables. Consider Code 3.4 as an example: variable pw->pw uid is passed
as a parameter in system function setuid() on line 10. Before variable pw->pw uid is used, it is
assigned by variable uid on line 4. Thus, uid is the dependent data of pw->pw uid, since the value
of pw->pw uid is directly related to uid.
An attacker can corrupt the dependent variable uid to indirectly alter the sensitive variable
pw->pw uid. Therefore, in order to guarantee the integrity of conditional branching data and
critical function parameters, all data that they depend on should be also protected.
Algorithm 3.1 Identify conditional branching data
Input: B: the set of basic blocks.
Output: S: the set of memory locations of critical data
1: S
{}
2: for b 2 B do
3:
for i 2 b do
4:
if i is a branch instruction then
. Point to the instruction
5:
currentint
locateIns(i, b);
. If the operand in currentInt is a variable
6:
if %rbp or %rsp in currentInt then
. Add non-control data to set S.
7:
d
idData(currentInt);
8:
S
d;
9:
else
. If it is a register
10:
reg
getReg(currentInt);
. Point to previous instruction
11:
currentInt
currentInt 1;
12:
while currentInt > 0 do
. If the register is assigned by a variable
13:
if varAssReg(reg, currentInt) then
. Recorde data
14:
d
idData(currentInt);
15:
S
d;
16:
else if regAssReg(reg, currentInt) then
. If the register is assigned by
another register
17:
reg
getReg(currentInt);
18:
currentInt
currentInt 1;

3.3.2

Sensitive Variable Identification

Section 3.3.1 defines three types of sensitive variables critical to data-oriented attacks. It is
relatively easy to identify such variables within source code, since the pre-defined variables written
by programmers provide convenient compartments, such as variable names and data types. How-
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ever, when performing analysis on binaries, variables are represented by an address expression like
[base + index ⇥ scale + of f set], which makes them not straightforward to identify.
To solve this issue, we design an identification method to automatically search for and identify
the three types of sensitive variables in binaries. We assume that given a target binary file f , the
analysis module in AutoEnclave generates a set of basic blocks denoted by B, a CFG denoted
by G, and a DFG denoted by D. A basic block b 2 B consists of a sequence of instructions with no
branches except in the entry or the exit. By taking B and D as inputs, the identification method
produces a set of locations of sensitive variables S in the target binary file as an output. The
identification method is constructed by multiple parts, which are demonstrated in the following.
3.3.2.1

Identify Conditional Branching Data

Algorithm 3.1 shows the method to identify conditional branching data. The basic idea is
to check each basic block and identify data associated with comparison and branch instructions.
Specially, from the given set of basic blocks B, Algorithm 3.1 first locates the branch instructions,
such as je and jne, in each basic block b in set B. If a branch instruction is found in the basic
block b, currentInt is pointed to the conditional instruction cmp that is associated with the branch
instruction. Then the operation instruction currentInt is analyzed to check whether the operand
of this instruction is a variable, such as %rbp and %rsp. If the operand is a variable denoted by d,
the memory location of d is recorded in the output set S. If the operand is a regular register, which
indicates the value in the register is passed from previous instructions, Algorithm 3.1 recursively
analyzes each previous instruction until reaching the beginning of the basic block or encounters an
instruction that assigns the register from a variable.
3.3.2.2

Identify Parameters in System and Library Function Calls

The second type of sensitive variables is the parameters in system and library function calls.
To identify them, our method first locates the call operation in each basic block and then identify
all corresponding data according to the operation’s calling convention. Calling convention is a
standardized method for programs to be implemented and executed by machines. System and
library functions are specified into uniformed formats by compilers to access subroutines in the
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assembly language. Therefore, by analyzing the calling convention for a function, data associated
with the functions can be identified.
Our approach focuses on protecting Linux x86-64 binaries with the calling convention that is
specified by the System V ABI. In this architecture, parameters of the integer, boolean, enumerated,
or pointer type in a function call are passed in six registers rdi, rsi, rdx, rcx, r8, and r9 in order.
Float and double types are transferred in xmm0, xmm1, xmm2, xmm3, xmm4, xmm5, xmm6, and xmm7
registers in order. Additional parameters are stored on the stack [65]. When identifying the
parameters, our approach first identifies a system or library function call. Next, by matching the
type, the number, and the order of the data of this function to the corresponding positions in the
calling convention, our approach extracts the parameters in the specific function call.
During the identification process, one issue to be noted is how to handle indirect calls such as
function pointers. A function can be called indirectly through a register instead of an identifier,
thus it is difficult to identify which function is being called by static analysis. To address this issue,
our approach recovers the procedure linkage table (PLT) from the target binary. The PLT contains
absolute addresses for all system and library function calls that are involved in the target binary.
Therefore, by comparing the calling convention of the function pointer with each calling convention
of the function in the PLT, we can identify which function is being called indirectly. If a function
pointer matches with one or more functions in the PLT, parameters associated with this function
pointer are considered as sensitive variables in our approach. If a function pointer does not match
with any function in the PLT, our approach considers this function is a user-define function and it
should be ignored.
Algorithm 3.2 shows the method to identify parameters associated with system and library
function calls. Specifically, from the given set of basic blocks B, the program linkage table P , and
the set of the calling conventions for all system and library function calls, Algorithm 3.2 first finds
the call instruction in each basic block. Then, if the name of a function that is called can be
identified in the call instruction and it is one of the system or library function calls, Algorithm
3.2 identifies all parameters associated with the function call according to its calling convention. If
a function is called via a function pointer, Algorithm 3.2 extracts the calling convention t of the
function pointer and compares it to each of the calling convention in the PLT. If t is matched with
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Algorithm 3.2 Identify parameters in system and library function calls
Input: B: the set of basic blocks., P : the procedure linkage table., C: the set of the calling
convention for all system and library function calls.
Output: S: the set of memory locations of critical data
1: for b 2 B do
2:
for i 2 b do
3:
if call 2 i then
. Identify the function name
4:
fn
idF unN ame(i);
5:
if f n 2 C then
. Identify parameters
6:
d
idP arByC(f n; i; b; C);
7:
S
d;
8:
else if f n is a register then
. If it is an indirect call
9:
t
extrCC(i, b);
. Extract calling convention
10:
if t 2 P then
. If the calling convention belongs to C
11:
d
idP arByC(t; i; b; C);
12:
S
d;
one of the calling conventions in the PLT, Algorithm 3.2 can identify this function and consider all
parameters associated with it as sensitive variables.
3.3.2.3

Identify Dependent Data

The last type of critical non-control data is dependent data. After all conditional branching
data and critical function parameters are identified by Algorithm 3.1 and Algorithm 3.2, all other
data that the already-identified data depends on should also be identified. To do that, we design
an algorithm to recursively extract all dependent data by analyzing the context-sensitive DFG [64].
Algorithm 3.3 shows the details of this method. From the given set of DFG D, Algorithm 3.3
recursively takes each variable k in set S as an input and outputs the updated set S with all data
that k depends on. Specifically, for each variable k in set S, Algorithm 3.3 first examines whether
k has been recorded before. If it is not in set S, Algorithm 3.3 updates set S with variable k, which
is further passed as a parameter to function processDFG. Function processDFG analyzes the DFG
and outputs all data that k depends on into set U . Next, each variable in set U is examined by
recursively calling Algorithm 3.3. If the data in set U is never recorded, it will be analyzed by this
algorithm recursively. Therefore, all dependent data associated with conditional branching data
and critical function parameters can be identified and recorded.
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Algorithm 3.3 Identify dependent data
Input: k: the data being examined., D: the data flow graph., S: the set of memory locations of
critical data.
1: RECU RSIV EDD(k)
2: if k 2
/ S then
3:
S
k;
. Record k in set S
4:
U
processDF G(k, D);
. Extract all data that k depends on
5:
for i 2 U do
. Recursively search all data in set U
6:
RECU RSIV EDD(k);
. Check data dependence for new data

3.4

Data Protection Based on SGX Code Instrumentation
With all sensitive variables identified in a target binary, a secure SGX-based memory region

needs to be created. Given the locations of sensitive variables in the binary, the instrumentation
module of AutoEnclave automatically instruments the binary such that all instructions operating sensitive variables are forced to write/load data to/from the protected enclave memory instead
of normal memory. In this section, we present the details of the binary instrumentation component module in AutoEnclave, which mainly focuses on two parts: enclave creation and binary
instrumentation. The enclave creation process creates enclaves to protect and operate all sensitive variables. The binary instrumentation module instruments the target binary file to make it
adaptable to handle the enclave functions.
3.4.1

Enclave Creation

Intel SGX enclave is allocated in the application’s memory space and is designed to be isolated from the outside memory regions. The only way to access the enclave memory is through
trusted functions that are defined at the time of the enclave being created. Figure 3.5 shows the
overall architecture of the enclave creation. It contains three files, Enclave.edl, Enclave.h, and
Enclave.cpp. The Enclave.edl holds trusted function prototypes that are used to communicate
with the outside. The Enclave.h and Enclave.cpp declare trusted function structures and data
structures that are used to operate all sensitive variables.
In order to store all sensitive variables in the enclave memory, data structures need to be
defined in the Enclave.cpp file. Our approach treats all data as integers since they are decoded
into binary code in the lowest-level of a machine. Therefore, the same number of integer variables as

45

Enclave file
Enclave.edl

Trusted function prototypes

Enclave.h

Trusted function declarations

Enclave.cpp

Trusted function codes and
data structures

Figure 3.5: Architecture of the enclave creation process

the identified sensitive variables are defined in the Enclave.cpp file. They also need to be indexed
in order to correctly pair them with sensitive variables during the execution. After all variables
are defined, trusted functions need to be constructed for operation purpose. In our approach, each
variable is associated with two trusted functions, which are used to write and read data respectively.
These trusted functions act as interfaces between the binary and the enclave. They are created
inside the trusted region of the enclave and can only be used to operate associated variables. The
code of the trusted functions is located in the Enclave.cpp file. The Enclave.edl file contains
prototypes of the trusted functions and processes ECALLS and OCALLS of the trusted functions to
communicate with the outside world [27]. Code 3.6 is a snippet of enclave.edl file, which is a mean
to demonstrate the enclave structure. Two trusted functions, enWriteV1 and enReadV1, are created
to operate the critical non-control variable with an index 1. During the execution, enWriteV1 and
enReadV1 are forced to be executed whenever the variable with the index 1 is written or read.

Figure 3.6: Enclave code snippet
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3.4.2

Fundamentals of Instrumentation

The binary instrumentation module in our approach rewrites binaries in a way that they are
forced to write and read sensitive variables from the protected enclave memory. To modify binary
executables, an instrumentation tool needs to be involved. Among existing instrumentation tools,
we choose Uroboros [66] as our binary instrumentation toolkit. Uroboros can automatically
disassemble stripped binaries and generate reassemble-able assembly code, which makes it suitable
to our approach. By adopting Uroboros, we are able to directly work on the assembly code of
binaries to add Intel SGX instructions and modify all operations associated with sensitive variables.
Moreover, since the assembly code extracted from binaries can be reassembled back to executables,
it is convenient to link binaries with the Intel SGX libraries during the reassembly process. Meanwhile, it is also efficient to find compliance issues, and reduce uncertainty when deploying code
instrumentation [63].

Binary file

Enclave functions

ELF header

create

Program header table

destroy

.section .text

verify

……

Enclave initialization

main

Critical data
transaction

……
……
.section .bbs

Enclave
global variables

.section .rodata

Enclave
local variables

Figure 3.7: Binary instrumentation architecture

Figure 3.7 shows the overall binary instrumentation architecture which demonstrates the basic
idea of how a binary is instrumented to make it adaptable to handle Intel SGX functions. The
left-hand side of this figure is the architecture of an ELF binary file. The right-hand side shows
what information and which part of the binary file are instrumented. Particularly, three sections
in the binary file need to be modified. The .text section houses all major functions for the enclave
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operations, such as enclave initialization and data transaction. The .bbs section and the .rodata
section hold the enclave parameters, such as global variables and local variables.
The .text section contains executable code. Therefore, additional functions need to be instrumented into this section in order to access to the enclave memory from the executable. In
this procedure, the first step is to initialize the enclave at the beginning of the execution. Intel
demonstrates how to write the enclave initialization function in C++. Since our approach directly
works on assembly code, we translate the initialization function to assembly code and add it to the
.text section as a regular function. A function call is added at the beginning of the execution so
as to call the initialization function.
Second, to efficiently prevent data-oriented attacks, all instructions, which operate sensitive
variables, need to be instrumented in a way that regular memory associated with vulnerable data
is no longer valid or used by binaries. To enforce this, all write and read operations associated with
sensitive variables are replaced with corresponding enclave function calls. These functions call the
enclave functions that are defined in the enclave.cpp file to write sensitive variables to or read
sensitive variables from the enclave memory.
Third, global and local variables, which are used by the enclave, are instrumented into the .bbs
section and .rodata section, respectively. The global variables include a global enclave ID and a
global enclave handle pointer. These two variables are used to communicate with the enclave. The
local variables contain the enclave debug information.
3.5

Implementation
Since Intel SGX does not support 32-bit enclaves on Linux, we prototype AutoEnclave for

x86-64 ELF binaries on the Ubuntu 16.04 64-bit system. Multiple state-of-the-art binary analysis techniques are integrated in our approach. In the analysis module, we adopt angr [64] to
provide the CFG and DFG constructions and Intel Pin [67] to taint sensitive variables. In the
instrumentation modules, Uroboros [66] is employed to disassemble stripped binaries and generate reassemble-able assembly code. By combining objdump and Uroboros, our approach is able
to analyze a target binary and provides an instrumented assembly code with Intel SGX enabled
which can be further reassembled back to the binary.
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3.6

Evaluation
We evaluated AutoEnclave with respect to correctness, efficiency, and the ability to defend

against data-oriented attacks. The correctness evaluation measures the accuracy of the sensitive
variable identification method. We used SPEC CPU 2006 [59] to evaluate the correctness and the
efficiency of AutoEnclave.
In our evaluations, all programs were compiled to 64-bit targets by GCC 4.6.3 without optimization.
3.6.1

Correctness

The first set of experiments measured the correctness of the sensitive variable identification
method. We first recorded the number of sensitive variables that are actually used during the
execution and then compared it with the number of sensitive variables identified by the identification
method. Our identification method is considered correct if all the sensitive variables used during
the execution is included in the set of the sensitive variables identified by the identification method.
In order to record the number of sensitive variables used during the execution, we used Intel Pin
[68] to dynamically measure the sensitive variable usage during the execution.
We evaluated the identification method on SPEC CPU 2006. Among all benchmarks from
the SPEC CPU 2006, we chose 11 benchmarks that are written in C. The results are shown in
Figure 3.8. A key observation from this figures is that the number of sensitive variables used during
execution is significantly smaller than the number of sensitive variables identified by our method.
A comparison result shows that all sensitive variables and dependent data used during execution
is identified by our identification method, which indicates that our sensitive variable identification
method may over-identify, but never under-identify sensitive variables.
3.6.2
3.6.2.1

Efficiency
File Size Overhead

The file sizes of instrumented binaries with their baseline file sizes were compared. The results
for 11 SPEC CPU 2006 binaries are presented in Figure 3.9. The average storage overhead is
4.1% for SPEC CPU 2006.
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Figure 3.10: Execution time overhead for Spec binaries
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3.6.2.2

Run-time Execution Overhead

To measure the execution time overhead of our approach, we used the SPEC CPU 2006
benchmarks [59] for its comprehensiveness and standardization. The results are shown in Figure
3.10. The average execution overhead for Spec is 128%.
To better understand the execution time overhead of our approach, we also measured the
execution times of accessing data in the ordinary memory (i.e., memory outside the enclave) and the
enclave. We designed a program that repeatedly reads/writes data from/to the ordinary memory
and the enclave, and calculated the average execution time for each operation. Results show that
accessing data in the enclave is around 300 times slower than accessing data in the ordinary memory,
which indicates that when enforcing AutoEnclave, more sensitive variables to be protected can
lead to more execution time overhead. Therefore, the set of sensitive variables should be as small
as possible in order to minimize the performance overhead, which is guaranteed by our sensitive
variable identification method as observed in Figure 3.10.
3.7

Related Work
In this section, we briefly summarize the research in the literature that is related to our work.

3.7.1

Data-oriented Attacks and Defenses

Data-oriented attacks were first demonstrated by Pincus and Baker [69]. They categorized
attacks that target only critical data structures as pure data attacks. Then, attacks of this type
were extensively studied by Chen et al. [17], who demonstrated that these attacks can have serious
implications among real-world applications. Their exploits need human e↵orts to manually identify
the vulnerable critical data from source code. Hu et al. [16] developed a solution to automatically
construct non-control data exploits. The key idea is to automatically stitch multiple existing data
flows to corrupt target variables in a program to alleviate the e↵orts of human analysis. A subtler
method to construct such exploits was presented by Carlini et al. [24]. They utilized certain
vulnerable functions, such as printf, to construct Turing-complete attacks against CFI. Recently,
Hu et al. published a more advanced work that can craft rich expressiveness data-oriented attacks by
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identifying data-oriented gadgets in programs [20]. Nonetheless, all these exploits rely on corrupting
sensitive variables, which can be identified and protected by our approach.
Many mechanisms have been proposed to combat data-oriented attacks. Data-flow integrity
ensures that the flow of data in a vulnerable program stays within a data-flow graph [21]. The dataflow graph is generated by static analysis, which makes the defense coarse-grained. Another type
of defense mechanisms focused on enforcing type- and memory-safety on systems. Softbound [23]
has brought memory safety to un-safe C language by using bound checking with fat-pointer. CETS
[70] enhanced this method by preventing memory management errors. CCured [62] introduced a
safe type system that statically detects the occurrence of memory error and dynamically enforces
bound checking on them. However, the high performance overhead limits the applicability of these
deployment. Besides, defenses of this type require major changes of a program’s source code to
adopt the safe dialects. Newsome et al. proposed a defense mechanism that does not require source
code to protect programs against data-oriented attacks [22]. This approach uses dynamic taint
analysis to label all critical data to track the propagation of tainted data, and therefore can detect
over-write attacks by identifying the integrity of tainted data. However, programs protected by
this technique run 24 times slower, which is too expensive to be adopted widely.
3.7.2

Intel SGX Implementations and Attacks

Intel SGX is designed to protect selected code and data from disclosure or modification. In
recent years, many mechanisms utilized this hardware feature to provide protection against sensitive
data leakage attacks. EnclaveDB [71] was a secure database that ensures the confidentiality and
integrity of sensitive data by placing tables, index, and other critical data in SGX. With the
assistance of hardware features, EnclaveDB achieved a low overhead comparing with traditional
database mechanisms. Ryoan [72] can mitigate the risks of leaking user’s privacy information by
providing a sandbox to protect the sensitive data. It was built upon SGX and can be applied
in various applications, including email filtering, heath analysis, image processing and machine
translation. Intel SGX has been also used to provide a trusted software running environment to
protect sensitive information. For examples, SCONE [73] and Haven [74] allow code to run inside
the enclave to guarantee the confidentiality and integrity of the program.
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Recent studies show that Intel SGX is vulnerable to side-channel attacks. These attacks can
be usually categorized as two types: cache-based side channel attacks and page-fault side channel
attacks [75, 76]. For cache-based side channel attacks, Flush-Reload [77] made the memory to be the
same with SGX, thus the amount of noise in the cache side channel is significantly reduced due to
the sharing of memory. For page-fault side attacks, attackers usually utilize the vulnerability in the
operating system that SGX relies on to manage memory resources to launch attacks. Pigeonhole
[76] and controlled-channel attacks [74] demonstrated that by manipulating the page table and
triggering a page fault sequence, attackers can infer the sensitive data in SGX. The work in [78]
proposed two improved attacks based on the page fault channel attacks with the accuracy improved
significantly. These techniques do not need to monitor channel noise to launch attacks, they only run
the victim applications once to exploit them. All of the attacks take advantage of input-dependent
memory access, cache-based timing, and trace-driven to tamper the secret data in applications.
AutoEnclave has a di↵erent application domain by moving sensitive variables into the enclave to
protect the data integrity of a program and therefore is not subject to such attacks with the main
objective to use side channels to steal sensitive data.
3.8

Conclusions
In this work, we presented an automated instrumentation toolkit, called AutoEnclave, which

leverages Intel SGX to automatically protect sensitive variables against data-oriented attacks. We
designed an identification method to automatically identify variables vulnerable to data-oriented
attacks in binaries. We also developed an instrumentation technique to instrument Intel SGX
protections into binaries to prevent sensitive variables from being corrupted. We described an
optimization method to reduce the overhead of enforcing Intel SGX protections in binaries.
We performed extensive experimental evaluations using SPEC CPU 2006. Our experimental
results show that the proposed tool can successfully identify sensitive variables and instrument
applications to prevent data-oriented attacks, and incur a 128% run-time overhead for SPEC
CPU 2006 binaries on average.
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CHAPTER 4
UNAUTHORIZED WALKING BEHAVIOR DETECTION FOR MOBILE
DEVICES1

4.1

Introduction
Evolutions in mobile technology have enabled mobile devices to become extensively personal

and valuable items, their loss or theft furthermore compromising important sensitive information.
Advocacy group Consumer Reports writes that 2014 sustained more than 3.1 million instances of
mobile device theft, despite myriad anti-theft measures available for users [28]. These measures all
focus on devices’ retrieval or prevention of information leakage, instead of attempting to make a
timely alert of the actual theft.
For example, included in Apple’s iOS 7 is a popular scheme which allows users to remotely
wipe and lock their devices, once a theft is discovered. A thief is unable, then, to read any of
the deleted data. Apple also o↵ers a free app called Find My iPhone which enables users to
collect GPS information from their devices for the opportunity to find and recover them. These
examples illustrate the reactive nature of current approaches and the void of proactive defenses.
They require discovery of the theft before any security actions can be made, and therefore allow the
thief full physical access of the device for a potentially notable amount of time. Security researchers
understand this to be the most powerful type of adversary.
In this sense, there are no true anti-theft mechanisms for mobile devices, just damage control
schemes. Accordingly, in this work we develop a means to detect stealing behavior, that is, ongoing
unauthorized movement of a device. Entitled Virtual Safe, we liken it to a physical safe for storing
valuables, as it enables the user to set down a device and restricts other individuals from removing
it without causing alarm. Because a thief has to walk away with a stolen mobile device, we employ
1
This chapter was published in IEEE Trans. Mobile Computing (TMC), Jun. 2018, [31], and IEEE Conference
on Communications and Network Security (CNS), Sept. 2016, [30]. Permission is included in Appendix A.
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motion pattern, or gait, authentication to verify the identity of the person in possession of the
device immediately whenever it is moved.
Human gait has been studied (e.g.,[79, 80]), and used in several previous behavioral biometric
schemes using various classification algorithms di↵erent from ours to authenticate users (e.g., [81,
82, 83, 84, 85]). Notably, these approaches all focus on empirically proving that human gait is
an e↵ective metric to identify human beings. However, these share a common feature of serving
as second-order authentication, which makes them impractical for anti-theft applications. More
importantly, none of the related papers we could find consider the time demand as a critical issue
for authentication. For anti-theft, it is critical for the detection scheme to render a timely decision
on the identity of the current device holder.
We thus o↵er a detection system for performing authentication whenever the mobile device is
moved, able to notify the owner before a thief escapes. Of the sensors o↵ered in modern devices,
we use the accelerometer, which monitors the device’s acceleration due to human movement. This
provides us occasion to begin authentication, as both a device owner and any potential thieves
necessarily cause a reading on this sensor as soon as they interact with the device. Once this
occurs, we compare the current user’s acceleration data with that of the owner to give a match
score, which if smaller than a threshold indicates unauthorized movement.
The proposed scheme does not impose limitations on which kind of comparison tools should
be used. To analyze the performance of di↵erent comparing tools, we apply Statistical Correlation
test (SC test) [86] and K-S Statistical test [87] into our matching methods. Each comparison tool
returns an outcome on whether or not two vectors are similar. More details is described in section
4.7.4. The performance of each comparison tool is depending on system miss detection rate, false
negative rate, and detection time. According to our experiment, K-S Statistical test gave the best
performance.
Additionally, a quick detection method should operate on a limited set of data to reduce the
total number of comparisons necessary. For this reason we work to identify the most representative
walking patterns for a user, those that are strongly matched with the rest of the raw accelerometer
data. Through construction of an algorithm which compares only the most representative walking
patterns using elementary arithmetic, in lieu of using sophisticated classification tools to classify
the whole raw data, we reduce the processing time to its minimum.
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Specifically, we have created motion synchronization techniques to extract step cycles from the
raw acceleration data for comparison between individuals. We have also created a representative
matching algorithm to find and compare “signature” step cycles for a behavior for improved accuracy and reduced processing time. Our case study shows that this matching method is theoretically
300 times faster than the traditional strategy of comparing all possible data. We find by real world
experiment that the proposed system distinguishes between our 45 volunteers with 96.4% to 98.4%
accuracy. Additionally, each particular participant in our experiment was static enough in walking
habits to be identified as themselves 97.8% of the time. Unauthorized movement of mobile devices
is detected within 10 to 20 steps, and battery usage overhead is around 4.7% for the typical user.
4.2

Related Work
Related work falls generally into solutions to be used once theft is realized and solutions to

strengthen the (un)locking mechanism on devices. We have already di↵erentiated our work from
these types, as a solution to detect ongoing theft before any (un)locking takes place. The Introduction discusses related work in walking gait authentication and the unique challenges and goals
of our system in comparison with these e↵orts, so this section will focus on other theft-reactant,
authentication-strengthening, and gait authentication work.
Most theft-reactant applications currently available are based on a combination of GPS, Wi-Fi
positioning and cell tower triangulation to track location. GadgetTrack is one popular anti-theft
application implemented both on Android and iOS systems [88]. Beside its tracking scheme, it can
encrypt photos and contacts on a stolen device and store them in a certified secure data center,
wiping any local personal information in the process. Also, the owner can remotely trigger a loud
alarm even if the device is in silent mode, to aid in finding it. A more blunt measure is proposed
by Gao et.al which locks SIM cards to their respective mobile phones [89]. If the phone is stolen,
the owner can call the service operators to disable the lost SIM card, which disallows any usage
of the device with that SIM card or any replacements. Apple o↵ers a similar protection, instead
using serial numbers to lock devices reported stolen.
In the group of strengthening authentication mechanisms, behavioral and physiological biometrics are increasing in utilization. These attempt to protect sensitive information on stolen devices
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from being compromised [90, 91, 92, 93, 94]. Li et al. implement re-authentication for mobile
devices using users’ finger movement classified by support vector machines [90]. This system can
continuously authenticate the owner during normal phone usage. It monitors and learns the owner’s
finger movement patterns to compare with those of the current user. Similarly, Shahzad et al. propose a gesture based user authentication scheme applying human-distinguishing features such as
finger velocity, device acceleration, and stroke time[91]. It is important to note that these methods
only start collecting data and doing re-authentication after the phone’s password has been entered,
while ours does authentication when the thief walks away with it and presumably before the thief
gets to a safe location to begin cracking the phone. Finally, Apple’s Touch ID represents a physiological biometric unlocking system to authorize users and purchases. A User needs only touch the
device’s Home button, and the system will authenticate the fingerprint.
Our approach is based on gait analysis technique on mobile devices. Some existing methods have
been proposed in this field. In [95] [96] [97], Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) is used to extract the
similar cycles as step data. These methods compare all patterns in the data between two adjacent
peaks and extract those most similar. The benefit of DTW is that it can compare two data patterns
with di↵erent size. Since the walking speed of one person may very in di↵erent situations, DTW
sounds suitable for human gait cycle extraction, but in practice, comparing patterns of di↵erent size
can not fully distinguish between normal behavior, irregular behavior, or noise. If some noise looks
like a normal step cycle but with a di↵erent size or altitude, DTW-based methods will consider
it a normal step cycle, which may cause high false positive or negative rates. Furthermore, these
methods assume that the collecting device is placed at a fixed position on the body. This assumption
is not appropriate for daily usage, where an individual may carry the phone in a pocket, hold it
out to look at it, place it in a bag, or switch pockets.
Other gait analysis techniques such as [98] and [99] use correlation and spectrum analysis,
respectively, to extract step cycles. Upon further inspection, we find that these methods can only
work in ideal situations out of the presence of noise and without common irregular behaviors. Lu
et al. proposed a gait verification method for mobile phones [100] which extracts gait features by
spectrum analysis. For gait verification, it applies a Gaussian Mixture Model to compare the gait
of the current user with the database.
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In the most robust related work in gait analysis we could find, Muaaz et al. propose another
mobile phone based gait authentication method again using DTW [101]. They analyze the performance under more realistic circumstances than other works by attempting some impersonation
attacks, and their results indicate that no impersonated behaviors are accepted by their system.
Ren et al. also proposed a user verification scheme leveraging gait patterns derived from acceleration readings to mitigate against user spoofing attacks [102]. Their method uses correlation to
extract human walking data and identifies the current user’s gait pattern. However, common to all
is that all gait features are stored and compared, so as time goes by, the required data processing
time will impermissibly increase. In a real-life theft situation, the thief may escape from the scene
quickly after stealing a phone, so the anti-theft mechanism must detect the stealing behavior in a
very short time. To solve all the problems mentioned before, we design new step cycle extraction
and gait authentication methods.

Figure 4.1: System construction

4.3

System Overview
Our system architecture was laid out in Figure 4.1. The Training module functions as a means to

populate the Identification Database with the device owner’s unique motion fingerprint. There, the
Motion Detection component is responsible for discovering that the device is currently experiencing
normal motion behaviors. After the Data Collection component then amasses raw accelerometer
data representing the owner’s motion behavior, the Feature Extraction component deconstructs
this data into features and then assembles it into this fingerprint. The Testing module performs
analogous actions to prepare a new fingerprint for the current user to be sent to the Identification
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module. There, this test fingerprint is compared in the Match component to the owner’s fingerprint
as retrieved from the Database component. Finally, the decision made by the Match component is
sent to the Action module as an Unlock action or an Alert action.
As stated in the Introduction, our challenge is to accurately identify a user within a short amount
of time, which requires both to use inexpensive calculations for low computational complexity and to
process only a small amount of data for limited required comparisons. More complex tools demand
more than acceptable time for comparison between motion patterns, and an unreasonably large
number of motion patterns to analyze exacerbates this. These efficiency issues are targeted first in
the Feature Extraction component, which houses our pattern synchronization method for processing
the raw acceleration data into representative motion patterns. The Match component further
handles these considerations with a collection of matching methods with di↵ering strengths, which
optimize the comparison process by identifying and considering only the most representative motion
patterns for a user. In the subsections below, we further enumerate these integral components
conceptually to illustrate the functionality of our system, followed after by technical details in
corresponding sections.
4.3.1

Pattern Synchronization Method

Existing tools like Dynamic Time Warping [103] and the K-S Test are intuitive solutions to
compare between two motion patterns which may vary in time or speed, but first require extraction
of these patterns from measurements. This is the goal of our pattern synchronization method,
namely the automatic parsing of individual steps from the raw accelerometer data. Consider Figure
4.2, showing the results of our feature extraction process. The two persons’ data are visibly di↵erent;
in fact, the step cycles (12 steps) extracted from person A are roughly 100 data points in length,
where the step cycles from person B are around 50 data points in length. As the accelerometer
collects data with a roughly static frequency, this corresponds to 1.3 seconds for person A’s stepping
pattern, and 0.5 seconds for person B. The second portion of feature extraction is the separation
of these steps into the appropriate motion behavior.
Our step parsing technique addresses several issues. We first define a step cycle as the data
between two negative peaks in the accelerometer data. This arises from our observation that as a
human lifts a leg, the body is overcoming gravity. The device observes a large downward peak in
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Figure 4.2: Examples of two walking patterns

acceleration, referred to in set theory as a local minimum, in its highest position when gravity is
felt the least.
Next, we must select an appropriate representative step cycle which we will use to divide the rest
of the data into cycles. We may not simply partition the data into cycles based on the local minima
only, because some minima are created by accelerometer noise, and others are caused by irregular
human behavior. Consequently, instead of defining a cycle as whatever data appears between two
successive local minima, we start with one minima and select from a set of nearby minima to find
which resultant cycle width best partitions the data. This exact process is described in Section 4.6
on Feature Extraction, but conceptually involves testing di↵erent cycle widths for cutting the data,
and finding which width allows a sufficiently high similarity between cycles.
4.3.2

Behavior Classification

In the event that a user alters motion behaviors (from walking to running, for example) during
a data collection period, we must classify each motion cycle into its appropriate behavior class.
During the training sequence, we cannot expect a user to perform static behaviors while using the
device. To handle this, we perform the pattern synchronization as previously described, resulting
in a representative cycle, a set of cycles which match highly with it, and the remainder of the data.
On the testing side, we simply use the representative and its similar cycles for matching, discarding
the rest. For training, however, all non-outlier data is useful, so nothing is discarded. We place
those similar cycles in the database as a single behavior, appending them to an existing set if there
is also strongly matched between the two sets. We then remove them from the collected data and
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repeat this process amongst the remaining data until none remains and the database has some
number of new behaviors added. In all, a user’s database will hold several behaviors, each with
correspondent cycles.
4.3.3

Matching Methods

After running pattern synchronization on test data and collecting a set of cycles corresponding
to one behavior, we attempt to match it to some behavior in the database to verify the user’s
identity as device owner. Initially, we do this in a conceptually simple traditional manner by
comparing all test cycles with every cycle in the database, and its broad data coverage results in
high accuracy. Nevertheless, this would be impractical for our application, as the processing time
would be a function of the database size, and hence larger databases would allow thieves more time
to escape.
We develop a randomization method to choose for comparison a selection of cycles, of static
number, to reduce processing cost significantly. Importantly, the decrease in accuracy from using
only a few sample cycles is not noticeable. We furthermore design a third matching method which
identifies the most important step cycles for comparison. This method retains roughly the same
accuracy as the traditional method, runs at least as quickly as the randomization method, and
stores a much smaller database than both other methods. More details about these methods are
demonstrated in Section 4.7.
4.3.4

Alarm Handling

Several options exist for alerting users of a device theft. These can be more or less obtrusive
dependent on the users’ specific needs. While a false alarm rate of 4.4% is low, the frequency of
users’ physical activity will determine how often false alarms are experienced. Some individuals
may not bring their mobile devices into their workplace, and consequently only walk with them
a couple times per day, going days without false alarms. Others may have a work environment
that necessitates carrying a tablet to various places throughout the day, and these users would
experience false alarms more often (but also be subject to more chance of theft). Consequently,
false alarms tolerance should be a factor in deciding the alert nature.
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The difficulty in setting such an alarm function is in striking a mix between being obtrusive
enough to instantly realize one’s device is being stolen, while being unobtrusive enough to be
excusable in well-mannered or professional settings. Essentially, one should not unduly disturb
nearby persons with an alarm unless the device is actually being stolen. A general use alarm could
employ the device’s password to maintain this divide, such that in the fairly rare event of a false
alarms, a user could prevent an annoying alarm. This might take the form of a progressively louder
sequence of alerts which the user can terminate with a password. This sequence would be chosen
by the user and could be a soft vibration followed by a sustained vibration, a soft ring, a loud ring,
and a sustained loud ring, for example.
Other completely unobtrusive (to others) solutions could involve the myriad of devices a user
regularly uses. For employees with desk jobs, an email alert would be ideal. If such a user is sitting
at a desk using a computer, then an email alert will be instantly visible, and the user will observe
quickly that the device is not in clothes pockets or on the desk nearby, and begin to look for the
thief. A false alarm will only result in an ignored email. In an emerging line of gadgetry, users with
smart watches could have alerts sent to these devices, which are attached to them at all times and
much harder to slyly pilfer than misplaced mobile devices.
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Figure 4.3: Device states

4.4

Motion Detection
When a device is sitting on a desk or being operated by a stationary user, the data recorded

by its accelerometer contains no valuable information that can be used to identify users. Hence
we should ignore this data rather than attempting process it into motion step cycles. However
we do need to detect the beginning of a motion pattern in a timely fashion. This is important
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during trainging and testing to avoid wasting any time in the user identification process. It is also
important during the training period, so that when the user enters the device password, the system
knows whether or not to collect and store data in the database. In order to do that, our approach
should distinguish between a state of rest or operation and a state of actual motion.
In rest or operation state, Figure 4.3 shows accelerometer readings for a device sitting on a
desk, being operated by a non-walking user, and being carried by a walking user respectively. The
dash line represents the device is sitting on a desk. There is no change of acceleration, which
makes it easy to identify. The solid line represents the device is being operated. The subtle
changes of accelerometer readings of this case is also easy to distinguish. A non-walking user will
be standing still or sitting in a chair so only a small random fluctuation is visible from the slight
random vibration of the hand. Figure 4.3 plots the accelerometer readings while a user types a
text message.
In actual motion state, in contrast to these two cases, a large acceleration, at least 2g, is sensed
when the device is being moved by the user, which is represented by the dash-dot line in Figure 4.3.
Hand movement di↵ers as it is normally a one-time motion like picking up a device from the desk, or
taking a device out of a pocket. A one-time motion leads to a single large acceleration spike, and so
the cycle identification algorithm as introduced in Section 4.3.1 will not find multiple similar cycles
from the accelerometer raw data. Therefore, in practice, we begin data collection upon detection of
vigorous acceleration change, and attempt to run the cycle identification algorithm after sufficient
data is collected. If no cycles are detected, the data is discarded, but if cycles are detected, they
will be stored in the database if training or sent to the Matching component if testing.
In other Consideration, some users enjoy playing video games that use the accelerometer as
control input. If a certain motion happens to be repeated frequently enough to appear within the
cycle detection window used in Section 4.6 (this is unlikely), our algorithm would identify these
motions as motion cycles and add them to the database for the user. This will not a↵ect the
detection accuracy but merely increase the storage and computational overhead slightly. To save
storage and computational e↵ort, our protocol calls for behaviors not observed after some time to
be deleted.
Finally, as we ignore the accelerometer data until it has registered a sufficiently large variation,
which is bigger than 2g, it is possible that an attacker, knowing this, could move the device
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without triggering any detectable walking cycles. The issue the thief would face is that with the
granularity of accelerometers in modern mobile devices, to do so would be exceedingly awkward,
and such abnormal behavior would arouse curiosity and suspicion from onlookers and likely the
device owner. Additionally, the thief would not be able to resume walking normally at any time
because at that point the walking movement detection would trigger data collection and subsequent
theft detection.
4.5

Data Collection
The next step after Movement Detection for both Training and Testing modules is Data Collec-

tion. On the training side, our approach entails the device collecting accelerometer data each time
the user inputs the correct unlock password, for ten minutes or until user termination, and only if
the accelerometer registers movement. Our experiment indicates the false negative rate decreases
sharply after collecting training data for one week, as discussed in section 4.8 on Evaluation.
In the event that a user begins to su↵er higher false negative rates, due to changing habits,
this training approach may be undertaken anew to regain high accuracy. Also, should a user wear
strikingly di↵erent clothes or hold the mobile device in di↵erent pockets from time to time, training
will need to be performed for each such case. This will not force the user to frequently retrain, but
rather to simply add some new behaviors to the database from time to time. In fact, we perform
our experiment with the device in di↵erent locations on the body to ensure it works well, and the
accuracy we report is the total accuracy including all device locations we tested. Furthermore, this
concept extends to the rare case when a device is shared by multiple users, as each user would
simply account for some number of behaviors in the database.
For day-to-day testing, after the training period is complete, our approach requests gathering
of accelerometer data whenever significant motion is detected. As previously mentioned, we do not
wait until the device is unlocked as in second-order authentication schemes, in favor of immediate
theft detection. In the event that an attacker knows of the anti-theft mechanism, we propose a
password requirement to power o↵ the device if it is currently undergoing Data Collection.
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4.6

Feature Extraction
We here enumerate the technical details of the feature extraction component of our system. In

doing pattern synchronization for input data, we identify step cycle width and partition the data
accordingly for later use in the database and matching components. The complications enumerated
in Section 4.3.1 are all addressed by this algorithm. At a high level, we find eligible local minima
and pick a starting point, testing other nearby minima for their ability to define a suitable data
partition width, and, if none work, repeating this for other starting points as necessary until a good
cycle is found. Pseudocode and extended documentation on the Algorithm 4.1.
Algorithm 4.1 Feature extraction pseudocode
Input: M = (X, Y, Z), g = 1, wSize = 200, threshold 1 = 0.8, threshold 2 = 40, where (X, Y, Z)
represents the values read from each axis, g represents the acceleration of gravity, wSize represents the size of sliding windows and threshold 1 and threshold 2 represent the cycle comparison thresholds, which are explained in Section 8.1.
Output: stepCycle: the set of step cycles
1: for all i < sizeof (M ), i = 1 do
. Remove the directional components
p
2:
M Si
Xi 2 + Yi 2 + Z i 2
3: for all i < sizeof (M S) wSize, i = wSize do
. Find all local minima
4:
if M S(i) < M S(i 1) and M S(i) < M S(i+1) then
5:
LocalM inima(j) = M S(i)
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:
21:
22:
23:
24:
25:

for all i < sizeof (LocalM inima), i = 1, j = 1 do
if LocalM inima(i) < g then
DP eaks(j)
LocalM inima(i)
j++
for all i < sizeof (DP eaks) 1, i = 1, j = 2 do
empty(delimiters)
for all k < wSize, k = 1 do
represent cycle(k) = M S(DP eaks(i) +k 1)
for all r < sizeof (DP eaks) 1, r = 1 do
for all k < wSize, k = 1 do
W indows (k) = M S(DP eaks(r) +k 1)
result = match(represent cycle, W indows)
if result > threshold 1 then
delimiter(j) = DP eaks(r)
j++
delimiter(1) = DP eaks(i)
if sizeof (delimiter) 1 > threshold 2 then
break
for all i < sizeof (delimiter) 1, i = 1 do
stepCycle(i) = M S(delimiter(i) : delimiter(i+1) )
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4.6.1

Possible Cycle Delimiter Search

Here we wish to take the raw accelerometer data and isolate from its local minima a set of points
which may separate out the step cycles. As a mobile device may be oriented in any direction, we
p
first remove the directional components of acceleration using M S= X 2 + Y 2 + Z 2 , where X, Y
and Z represent the values read from each axis [104].
Owing to our usage of a sliding window later in the process, for our next steps we remove from
consideration the first and last few moments of data. This padding is included in the Candidate
Endpoint Test in Section 4.6.2 but excluded from the Window Placement process as we would
otherwise be searching outside of the dataset.
Next, local minima are found throughout the trimmed data, simply distinguished as those points
whose neighbors are both of larger value. All points plotted on the acceleration data in Figure 4.4
are local minima, but as stated in Section 4.3.1, we are concerned only with the large downward
peaks. The minima on those downward peaks are our step delimiters, which are a subset of all local
minima. Additionally, though not visible on these figures, some minima created by accelerometer
noise or irregular human behavior are lower than our step delimiters. With the understanding that
all valid step delimiter minima should be some distance below 1g, the acceleration due to gravity, we
set this threshold and analyze the set of local minima satisfying it. Figure 4.4 shows the resultant
set of step delimiters for a sample. To proceed, we choose at random one such delimiting point.
4.6.2

Representative Cycle Search

This process finds a step cycle length which will e↵ectively split the acceleration data along the
cycle starting points. This cycle we call the representative cycle, as it will appear similar to most
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cycles in the data, thereby providing a template for this data partitioning. We begin with the set
of likely cycle delimiters and one of them chosen as a test delimiter. In what follows, we search for
what may be the other end of the cycle and test to see if that cycle is a representative cycle.
For window placement, we restrict the rest of the data to a window around the test delimiter,
containing candidate points for the other end of the cycle. This restriction narrows the search space
for faster processing. Noting though that invalid points may still enter this set, it should contain
multiple candidate endpoints and should be wide enough to accommodate any valid step cycle. For
example, some small noise around the edge of a step cycle might result in two local minima at that
edge, one of which should be ignored. Our experiment employed a range of 200 data points on
right side of the delimiter and found this befitting of all our volunteers’ data sets.
For candidate endpoint test, We first test the closest candidate endpoint within the window and
move outward to other points if necessary. We use this candidate’s distance from the test delimiter
to define the test block size. We partition the data set by this test block size and then use comparing
tools to compare each constituent block. The statistical correlation and the K-S statistical tests are
used as comparison tools in our experiment. If the comparing result is sufficiently high between a
sufficient number of blocks, this indicates the test delimiter and candidate endpoint enclose a valid
step cycle representative of most other step cycles within the data, i.e. the representative cycle.
Conversely, if the comparing result is low, another candidate stopping point within the window is
selected and the process repeated.
For search repetition, should this search return no endpoint that defines a representative cycle,
we choose another candidate from our set of possible step cycle delimiters. We repeat the window
placement and candidate endpoint tests for this new delimiter, and if necessary, continue choosing
others not already tested until one yields a representative cycle.
4.6.3

Data Partitioning

Having discovered a representative step cycle, we may now partition the data accordingly so that
it may be stored in the Database for training or sent to the Matching component for testing. The
representative cycle defines our working cycle size, by number of data points. As the accelerometer
collects data at a roughly constant rate, this corresponds to a static time frame of length equal to
the duration of the individual’s stride. Working outward from our representative cycle, we partition
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Figure 4.5: Extracted cycles

the data into blocks of that length, excluding blocks which run into the padding data cut at the
beginning of the Cycle Delimiter Search (Section 4.6.1).
Having performed all these steps, the dataset originally shown in Figure 4.4 has now been
partitioned into the 12 cycles shown in Figure 4.5. This is the result of our Feature Extraction
process.
4.7

Matching Methods
After pattern synchronization, the individual steps are identified and extracted from the raw

accelerometer data. Then, the behavior classification procedure groups similar steps (i.e., the steps
that are highly matched) together to form a behavior set of the user. As discussed earlier, a
user may exhibit di↵erent behaviors like walking and running. Thus, when the training phase is
complete, the database will include multiple behavior sets, each containing the step cycles that are
extracted from the corresponding behavior.
The matching phase compares unknown step cycles with the cycles stored in the training
database to identify any unauthorized moves. Let B = {S1 , S2 , ..., Sn } denote the set formed
by the behavior sets, where Si = {si1 , si2 , ..., sim } is the i-th (1  i  n) behavior set and sij is
the j-th (1  j  m) step cycle in Si . Further let Su = {su1 , su2 , ..., sul } denote the behavior set
formed by the step cycles from unknown users.
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4.7.1

Method 1: All Cycles

In this strategy, we compare all the elements in Su against all the elements in each Si 2 B.
Specifically, 8Si 2 B, we compare all sij 2 Si to all suk 2 Su and threshold the average of the
comparison results to determine if Si ⇡ Su . A positive result indicates the unknown behavior Su
belongs to the owner.
With n behaviors in the database, m cycles per behavior, and l cycles in the unknown behavior,
the total number of comparisons is therefore nml. Sufficiently large m and l (enough training and
testing cycles) should conceptually result in the best accuracy, because this gives the broadest view
of the data. This does, however, require the largest number of comparison calculations that can
be made between the database and unknown behavior trace. For the more high-end devices, this
may be reasonable, but we o↵er additional methods focused on optimization, for more universal
application.
4.7.2

Method 2: Random Cycle Subset

To introduce this method, we note that the step cycles classified each particular behavior during
cycle extraction were those strongly matched with each other. Therefore, a randomly selected subset
of these will continue to strongly match with the rest of the set, which should mean similar accuracy
in matching, but with only a static number of comparisons independent of database size. Namely,
8Si 2 B, we choose a random subset SiRS ⇢ Si (subscript RS stands for “random subset”). We
choose a subset SuRS ⇢ Su as well. All random subsets are of a pre-configured size q which are
100, 10, 5, and 1 in our experimentation to be large enough to represent the original behaviors.
Then, 8Si 2 B, we compare all sij 2 SiRS to all suk 2 SuRS to determine if Si ⇡ Su , averaging and
thresholding as before.
Holding n behaviors in the database, p cycles per behavior, and q cycles in the unknown behavior
corresponds to npq total comparisons, compared with nml for the Traditional method. With p ⌧ m
and q  l, the processing required is orders of magnitude smaller for the typical user. Nevertheless,
as with any thresholding system, some step cycles are most matched with others, while some are
consistent enough to be included in the behavior but aren’t those best cycles. Ideally we would
choose these “signature” cycles to represent a behavior, but if an imperfect step cycle is randomly
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chosen, it will play a comparatively negative role in making the final matching decision and hence
reduce the overall detection accuracy.
We will evaluate processing times and accuracy for all matching methods, but as an example,
after a seven day training period, we identified a total of 22 training behavior sets for a volunteer
phone user, each set including 300 step cycles. Assuming that the unknown behavior set has 20
step cycles, the traditional method requires 132,000 comparisons (i.e., 22 ⇥ 300 ⇥ 20). However,
with q = 10, the random cycle subset method requires 2,200 comparisons only (i.e., 22 ⇥ 10 ⇥ 10),
while achieving similar accuracy.
4.7.3

Method 3: Signature Cycle Subset

To solve this challenge, we propose to identify and use for comparison these “signature” training
and testing step cycles. The comparison protocol is similar to that of the random cycle subset
method, choosing 8Si 2 B a subset SiSS ⇢ Si (with subscript SS referring to “signature subset”)
and a subset SuSS ⇢ Su . 8Si 2 B, we compare all sij 2 SiSS to all suk 2 SuSS to determine if
S i ⇡ Su .
First, however, we must detail how to select a signature subset. The cycles included should
achieve the highest consistency with the others in this behavior, to best reflect the typical motion
behavior of the user. We define the most representative step cycle below:
Definition 1. (Most Representative Step Cycle) The step cycles extracted from the accelerometer
P
readings form the set S. The most representative step cycle s⇤ is defined as arg max x2S F (s, x),
s2S

where F (·) is the comparison function. Equivalently, s⇤ is the step cycle that results in the highest
P|S|
value of i=1 F (s, xi ), where xi is the i-th step cycle in S.
In a simple extension, the v most representative step cycles in a behavior S are those resulting in
Pi=|S|
the v highest values of i=1 F (s, xi ). These cycles are considered the signature cycles and added
to SSS . An important aspect of this process is the fact that it may be done for the training dataset

once training is complete. This preprocessing trims the database to hold only the signature cycle
subsets which lowers its data storage footprint significantly compared to the traditional Methods
and Method 2. Additionally, the total number of comparisons is nvq, which q is the number of
cycles in the unknown behavior, like Method 2.
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4.7.4

Comparison Tools

A step cycle is a portion of the accelerometer reading, and so is a vector of accelerometer
sample points. To compare two vectors of step cycles, we may utilize existing classification tools
as mentioned before (e.g., K-S statistical test [87], Total Variation Distance [105], or statistical
correlation [86]). Regardless of the type of classification tool, each returns a comparison outcome
on whether or not two vectors are similar. For example, the total variation distance calculates the
space between the statistical distributions of both vectors and this distance serves as an indicator
of the similarity between both vectors. We calculate the average of the comparison outcomes and
compare it with a threshold to make a matching decision.
In this work, we apply the statistical correlation and the K-S statistical tests to compare two
vectors of accelerometer data. Both tests are typcial statistical comparison tools that have been
widely used for classification. Let x = [x1 , x2 , ..., xm ] and y = [y1 , y2 , ..., yn ] denote two vectors of
length m and n respectively. In the statistical correlation test, the comparing result between x and
y is calculated by

Pi=min(m,n)

test statistic is max
x

xi y i
.
min(m,n)

i=1

⇣

Fˆ1 (x)

In the K-S statistical test, we used two-sample K-S test. The
⌘
Fˆ2 (x) , where Fˆ1 (x) and Fˆ2 (x) are the proportion of x and y values,

respectively, less than or equal to x. Assuming that we made a total of

comparisons between

RT and RU , each comparison returning a comparing value, we then compare the average of the
comparing values to a threshold. If the average is larger than the threshold, then the unknown
behavior is identified. Otherwise, the unknown behavior does not match the current behavior set
and it is compared to the next behavior set until a match is identified. If no matching is found
after all the behavior sets are exhausted, the move is considered unauthorized.
4.7.5

Methods Discussion

We will provide a thorough examination of the e↵ectiveness of each method in the following
section on Evaluation, but compare the methods more conceptually here with regards to computational complexity. The traditional method is the slowest. In our experiment, after two weeks of
training, the user converges to 22 behaviors and each behavior comprises 300 step cycles. We used
10 cycles extracted from the unknown data for comparison. Thus, the number of comparisons is
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66, 000 (22 ⇥ 300 ⇥ 10), for which we find an accuracy of 97.5% distinguishing between users and
97.8% identifying users as themselves.
Method 2 is expected to have a good performance in detection accuracy when the value of
p (the number of step cycles in each training behavior) and q (the number of step cycles in the
known behavior) are large enough to represent the original behaviors. So how large should p and
q be? We find in experiments that p = 100 and q = 10 gives an accuracy similar to the traditional
method, while the number of comparisons is 22, 000 (22 ⇥ 100 ⇥ 10). This means that Method 2
is theoretically 3 times faster than the traditional one for the same accuracy. The performance
becomes unstable when there are not enough cycles to represent the whole behavior, i.e., when p
and q are small. In particular, when p = 1 and q = 10, accuracy lowers to 94.6% distinguishing
between users and 86.7% identifying users as themselves.
For Method 3, we find in experiments that the proposed detection system can achieve a relatively
good performance using only a single signature step cycle (the most representative one) from each
training behavior. In this case, p = 1 and the number of comparisons becomes 220 (22 ⇥ 1 ⇥ 10),
which is theoretically 300 times faster than the traditional method. Nevertheless, the achieved
accuracy is similar to the traditional method with 96.4% distinguishing between users and 97.8%
identifying users as themselves.
4.8

Evaluation
Our experiment involved 45 volunteers comprising 22 women and 23 men whose ages rang from

18 to 50. During the data collection sessions, each participant was instructed to walk and run 20
meters, holding the data collection device in a variety of positions. These included in the left hand
and right hand, in a bag held by the left and right hand, and in a backpack, for a total of 5 locations
per movement type.
In the evaluation, we analyze our detection system’s performance when the statistical correlation
and the K-S statistical tests are used respectively. For each comparison tool, we first examine
the comparison threshold for ensuring step cycles are extracted correctly. Next, we present our
evaluation metrics and methodology, following this with a discussion on comparison threshold
optimization for each of our matching methods. Training and testing time complete the evaluation.
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4.8.1

Statistical Correlation Test

Comparison tools are used in multiple modules from the detection system, such as Motion Detection module, Feature Extraction module and Matching module. Following sections demonstrate
the performance of our detection system based on Statistical Correlation test.
4.8.1.1

Cycle Extraction

We cover in Section 4.6 the technical details involved with partitioning raw data into step cycles
and here ensure that the number of cycles extracted matches with our observation of the data. In
particular, a cycle width is chosen which cuts the data into a series of blocks that match highly
with each other. Through this experiment we define the term ”highly.”
Our observations of the raw data indicate volunteers took 40 steps on average, for each motion
and device location trial. Some took more or less than that, but an average of 40 steps suggests
that we need a comparison threshold that results in an average of 40 steps for each test. By using
the Statistical Correlation test, we test thresholds ranging from 0.6 to 0.9, and plot the results in
Figure 4.6. This illustrates that with a comparison threshold of 0.8, an average of 40 cycles are
extracted from each trial, as desired. We use this threshold for cycle identification throughout all
further evaluation.
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4.8.1.2

Matching Methods

The metrics we use to evaluate our three matching methods in the following sections are Distinction and Self-Identification. Distinction refers to the di↵erentiation of individuals from each
other, and represents the recognition of the current device holder is a thief. Self-identification refers
to the matching of users to themselves, representing the system verifying the current device holder
as the owner. In common terminology, Distinction and Self-identification represent true negatives
and true positives, respectively. Naturally, we wish for these metrics to yield a high percentage and
their inverse error rates to be low. The false positive rate is the inverse of the true negative rate,
showing the portion of volunteers who would be able to impersonate some others. Similarly, the
false negative rate indicates the number of volunteers not correctly identified as themselves, who
would be wrongly flagged as thieves.
Ascertaining these error rates involves a comparison of each volunteer’s data to that of every
volunteer. False positive rate is defined mathematically as the number of tests where we cannot
distinguish between individuals. For 45 people, each analyzed against every other (but not themselves), this is some fraction of 1980 tests. The false negative describes the amount that individuals
cannot be recognized as themselves, so for 45 people compared only to themselves the False negative
rate is a portion of 45 such tests. Hence, to calculate the False positive rate, we use the full data
sets for each volunteer, but for the self-comparison required to find the False negative rate, we use
half a user’s data for training and the other half for testing.
Our evaluation testing di↵ers slightly here from what would occur in practice, as we are attempting to match users’ full databases to each other, rather than one sample behavior vector to a
database. In other words, in practice we collect a single test behavior and try to find a match, but
for this evaluation we are trying to match any of the behaviors in one database to any in the other.
As such it should be noted that this is akin to a thief having several chances to steal a device, so
the low error rates are actually an upper bound on the error.
In Method 1, to refresh, our preliminary matching method uses all available cycles to inform
its decision, comparing cycle in one data set to every cycle in the other, and finding the average of
these comparing result. This averaging reduces the impact of noise to better reflect the situation as
a whole, so this method should be the most accurate. Figure 4.8 depicts a cumulative distribution
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function (CDF) view of our partitioning e↵orts. The dashed line represents the true positive rate,
referring to the correct matching of users to themselves. The solid line represents the true negative
rate, referring to the correct di↵erentiation of individuals from each other. In other words, the true
negative rate indicates the percentage of people successfully distinguished from other people, while
the true positive rate indicates the percentage of users correctly identified as themselves. This figure
suggests a comparison threshold somewhere around 0.75 is best since the vertical distance between
the True positive and the True negative lines is the longest at this value. Most true positive tests
find comparing result larger than this value, and most distinction tests arrive at a lower value.
With this realization we optimize the error rates by varying the comparison threshold between
0.6 and 0.85, with results visible in Figure 4.9. We find an intersection of the error rates around
a threshold of 0.75, which allows only 2.5% false positive and 2.2% false negative rates. This
corresponds to 97.5% true negative and 97.8% true positive rates, which is indeed nicely accurate.
In Method 2, This method revisits the use of comparison average but only for a static number of
cycles, in an e↵ort to optimize processing time. Choosing a number p of cycles randomly from each
behavior, we compare each from one behavior to every one from the other behavior, and thereby
limit to a fixed number of computations. A threshold is then applied to the average comparison
between this subset of cycle pairs. In Figure 4.11, the CDF reports true negative and true positive
curves for various p. While the true negative curves are fairly similar for di↵erent p, there is some
separation in the true positive curves. A higher p, of 100 cycles, is more desirable than the low p
of 1 cycle.
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Reviewing Figure 4.7 and the error rates for four p values depicted there, the degradation of
accuracy with lower p is visible. We find that while an p of 1 causes undesirable error rates, an p of
100 results in a high accuracy, which is the same as the accuracy of the Method 1. The error rates
for p equal to 20, 10, and 5 are 2.6%, 2.8%, and 3.9%, respectively, for false positive, and 4.4% in
all cases for false negative. This method finds that p = 100 is large enough to represent the original
behaviors and achieve comparable accuracy to Method 1.
In Method 3, The final matching method builds from the random cycle subset method and
attempts to decrease the training database storage footprint, through identifying behavior representative cycles after training and storing only those. Again we must choose a number v of cycles to
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use from the training behavior sets, but unlike the previous method we only store these cycles. We
alter testing behavior set length independently to compare with these v cycles per training behavior. Specifically, we try testing set sizes of 10 cycles (20 steps) and 5 cycles (10 steps), and compare
them with 10 signature cycles and 1 signature cycle. Each cycle from the database’s behavior sets
is compared with all cycles from the test behavior, and their comparison averaged as before.
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Figure 4.14: False positive and false negative for Method 3 based on SC test

Figure 4.10 indicates that the accuracy is rather similar among these options, meaning that
a user can opt for slightly lower accuracy in order to achieve a faster detection time. That said,
Figure 4.14 indicates that with a comparison threshold of 0.814, a training size v of 10 cycles and
a testing size of 10 cycles (20 steps) provides the best accuracy with a false positive rate of 3.6%
and false negative rate of 2.2%. Although it is not as good as the Method 1, this method saves a
lot of comparison time, one of the important goals in this project.
4.8.1.3

Detection Time Based on Statistical Correlation Test

Our application also requires the quick detection, so that a thief may be identified before eluding
the owner. Detection time is measured over two components, data collection and data analysis.
79

1

Percentage

0.8
0.6
0.4

AVG
p=100
p=10
p=5
p=1
v

0.2
0
10 -4

10 -3

10 -2

10 -1

Time

Figure 4.15: CDF of running time with multi-methods based on SC test

The former refers to the number of steps that the attacker must take before an accurate decision
can be made, while the latter refers to the processing time of that decision.
For data collection, we reiterate the success of the cycle subset matching method using ten
randomly chosen step cycles from training and testing datasets, as well as the success of the signature subset method using five or ten cycles. We conclude then that 10 to 20 steps are all that
is necessary to provide a testing dataset with our stated accuracy of 96.4% to 97.5% true negative
and 97.8% true positive.
Data analysis time is the time required for parsing the collected data into step cycles and then
behavior data, followed by comparison with the database. This time varies with the matching
method used for comparison, so a Statistical Correlation based CDF of processing time stemming
from di↵erent methods appears in Figure 4.15. “AVG” refers to the traditional method of averaging
all data, and the lines prefixed “p=” correspond to di↵erent values of p for the random cycle subset
method. “V” is the average case for the signature cycle subset method, the variants of which all
performed roughly the same. The traditional method is clearly slowest, while the random subset
method has varying runtimes based on the subset size. The signature cycle subset method with
all tested parameters is very close to the random subset method with p = 1, confirming it as the
most cost-efficient method. This method provides a match decision in 1 ⇥ 10
the above-mentioned high accuracy.
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Figure 4.16: E↵ects of threshold on cycle extraction based on K-S test

4.8.2

K-S Statistical Test

As mentioned in Section 4.7.4, K-S Statistical test is one of the most popular nonparametric
test to decide whether or not two vectors of data are from the same continuous distribution. In
this section, we analyze the performance of the detection system based on the K-S Statistical test.
4.8.2.1

Cycle Extraction

We cover the procedure of extracting step cycles in Sections 4.6 and 4.8.1.1 . In our experiment,
the average number of steps taken by a volunteer is 40, and therefore set the extraction method to
extract an average of 40 steps for each test. By using K-S Statistical test, we test thresholds ranging
from 0.2 to 0.8. The result is shown in Figure 4.16. This figure suggests that with a threshold of
0.4, an average of 40 step cycles are extracted. This threshold is used for cycle identification in the
following evaluation.
4.8.2.2

Matching Methods

The basic procedure of evaluating our three matching methods in this section is the same as
we described in Section 4.8.1.2. We use true negative and Self-Identification to evaluate our three
matching methods. The performance of three matching methods when using the K-S Statistical
test is described below.
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Figure 4.17: CDF for thresholding Method2 based on K-S test

For Method 1, this preliminary matching method compares all cycles in database to detect
whether or not the current user is authorized. Figure 4.12 is a CDF report of our partitioning
e↵orts, suggesting that a comparison threshold around 0.106 gives the best performance, since the
vertical distance between the true negative line and the true positive line at data point 0.106 is
the longest. With this suggestion we optimize the error rates by varying the comparison threshold
between 0.25 and 0.35.
Figure 4.13 shows the result. An intersection of the two lines is located around a threshold of
0.26, which indicates 1.6% false positive rates and 2.2% false Negative rates. This equals to 98.4%
true negative rates and 97.8% true positive rates.
For Method 2, this method chooses a number p of cycles randomly from each behaviors in
database to compare with every behaviors extracted from current user. Figure 4.17 shows true
negative and true positive in a CDF view. The true negative curves are fairly similar for di↵erent
p except when p = 1, which indicates as p increases leads to more stable performance.
Figure 4.18 shows the error rates for four p values by varying the comparison threshold between
0.1 to 0.4. The error rates for p equal to 100, 10, and 5 are 4.4%, 5.3%, and 5.9% with a threshold
0.314, 0.268, and 0.259, respectively, for false positive, and 4.4% in all cases for false negative.
p = 100 gives the best performance with 95.6% detection and 95.6% true positive rates.
For Method 3, this final method only consider subsets of signature cycles in order to reduce
comparison time and decrease the training database storage footprint. The testing set sizes considered in this section are those considered by Section 4.8.1.2. Figure 4.19 indicates that the accuracy
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Figure 4.18: False positive and false negative for Method 2 based on K-S test
Table 4.1: Comparison Tools Overview

Detection
Self-Identification
Comparison times
Detection Time

Statistical Correlation Test
Method 1 Method 2 Method 3
97.5%
97.4%
96.4%
97.8%
95.6%
97.8%
66000
22000
220
1
2
1 ⇥ 10
1 ⇥ 10
1 ⇥ 10 4

K-S Statistical Test
Method 1 Method 2 Method 3
98.4%
95.6%
96.4%
97.8%
95.6%
97.8%
66000
22000
220
1
2
1 ⇥ 10
0.5 ⇥ 10
0.8 ⇥ 10 4

is relatively similar among these di↵erent set sizes. Comparing to the performance of Method 2
shown in Figure 4.17, decreasing the set size in Method 3 does not a↵ect the performance.
Figure 4.20 indicates that with a comparison threshold of 0.413, a training size v of 10 cycles
and a testing size of 10 cycles provides the best accuracy with a false positive rate of 3.1% and false
negative rate of 2.2%. A training size of 1 cycle and a testing size of 5 cycles provide the smallest
comparison time and also a false positive rate of 3.6% and false negative rate of 2.2%.
4.8.2.3

Detection Time Based on K-S Test

As mentioned in Section 4.8.1.3, detection time must be small enough to prevent a thief eluding
the owner. Figure 4.21 is a CDF of processing time stemming from di↵erent methods based on K-S
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Figure 4.19: CDF for thresholding Method 3 based on K-S test

Statistical test. The meaning of the legend in this figure is the same as that in Figure 4.15. Figure
4.21 shows that the traditional method has the slowest detection time. The random cycle subset
method has a detection time that varys from 0.7 ⇥ 10

4

to 0.5 ⇥ 10

2

second based on the subset

size. It’s detection time is smaller than the traditional method.The signature cycle subset method
is very close to the random subset method with p = 1. Since the random subset method with p = 1
causes undesirable error rates, therefor the signature cycle subset method is the most cost-efficient
method.
4.8.3

Comparison Tools Overview

In previous sections, we analyzed our detection systems performance by using the statistical
correlation test and the K-S statistical test respectively. Table 4.1 summarized the results in Section
4.8.1 and Section 4.8.2, it shows an overview of the best performance achieved by each method.
Specifically, Method 1 compares all avaiable data. Method 2 applies the situation with 10 cycles
randomly chosen from each behavior. Method 3 uses the result that get from a training size of 1
signature steps cycles and testing size of 10 signature steps cycles.
Regardless of two comparison tools, Method 1 has the best accuracy among all these methods.
However, it has the longest comparison and detection time, which is fatalistical for the proposed
anti-theif detection system. Comparing with other methods, Method 2 has a mediocrity performance with detection rates varying from 95.6% to 97.4% and a 95.6% true positive rate. Although
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Figure 4.20: False positive and false negative for Method 3 based on K-S test

the accuracy for Method 3 is not the best one, it has the smallest comparison and shorest detection
time.
For both K-S Statistical and Statistical Correlation tests, the performance of all the three
matching methods in terms of detection accuracy is roughly the same. But the K-S Statistical test
has a shorter detection time when using Methods 2 and 3. For a large training databse, the K-S
Statistical test will reduce the detection time significantly.
The size of the database will increase significantly as time goes by. Figure 4.18 and 4.20 show
the impact of the larger database on the accuracy. As p increases, the size of the database also
increases, leading to decreased error rates. For example, when p drops from 100 to 1, the false
negative rate increase from 0.05 to 0.1. Increasing the database implies the increased detection
time. Nevertheless, we can keep the size of the database small by using the signature step cycles
only, which are extracted by Method 3. Specifically, in our experiment, the database size is reduced
from 54000 step cycles to 1350 signature cycles by using Method 3, while a 96.4% detection rate is
promised.
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Figure 4.22: E↵ects of varying training time

4.8.4

Training Time

A good anti-theft system should not be intensive in its initial setup. To ensure that our system
satisfies this requirement, we analyze the e↵ects of varying training times on the resulting accuracy.
Specifically, we asked one volunteer to continue collecting data every day for two weeks. We used
the first half of this data as the training set and the second as the testing set. Then we included
increasing portions of the training set and measured the accuracy against the full testing set. The
accuracy relative to number of training days included is shown in Figure 4.22. With more training
data available, the false negative rate, otherwise described as the difficulty in identifying the user
as that individual, decreases sharply.

86

Number of Behaviors

30

20

10

0

2

4

6
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For this user, six days of training resulted in a 0% false negative rate, or 98% true positive rate.
During this time, 22 behaviors were identified and stored in the database. Figure 4.23 shows how
as training continues fewer new behaviors are added. In all, after a sufficiently long training period,
users converge to a set of core behaviors which can strongly identify them.
Table 4.2: Power Consumption
State
Motion state
Standby state

4.8.5

Initial
54%
54%

20 Mins
52%
54%

40 Mins
50%
53%

60 Mins
47%
53%

Power Consumption

Mobile device battery life is precious, and, as such, we must verify that our system incurs
sufficiently low overhead to maintain usability. As mentioned in Section 4.4, our approach only
processes data when the device is in the actual motion state. The rest of the time, no computation
is necessary aside from cursory supervision of the accelerometer, so battery life will be less a↵ected.
Therefore we monitor the power usage of our approach in di↵erent states for a one hour duration
using an iPhone 6 plus; table 4.2 shows the result. The initial power of the device is 54%, and after
one hour in the walking state, 47% of power remains, for a 7% power consumption per hour of
walking state. Likewise, with an initial battery status of 54%, 53% of power remains after one hour
of standby mode, for a consumption of roughly 1% per hour while monitoring for state changes.
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To better quantify these results, consider a two-day study by The New York Times in 2003
tracking walking habits of 1,136 adults around the United States. The study found that Americans
take about 30 to 40 minutes of walking per day on average[106]. With this duration of walking state
processing and the remainder of 24 hours time monitoring for walking state change, our approach
requires at most 3.5% to 4.7% of the battery each day.
4.9

Conclusion
We proposed a fast anti-theft system that can detect authorized movement of mobile devices.

Simply speaking, we perform authentication whenever the device is moved via walking. To design such a system, we created motion synchronization techniques that can extract step cycles
from the raw accelerometer data to enable comparisons between individuals. We also created a
representative matching algorithm to compare the “signature” step cycles for a behavior instead
of comparing all possible data, for improved accuracy and reduced comparisons. We performed
extensive experimental evaluation using the accelerometer data collected from 45 volunteers. Our
experiment results show that the proposed system can successfully detect an unauthorized move
within 10 to 20 steps by a detection accuracy of 96.4% to 98.4%, while also distinguishing the
current move as by the owner 97.8% of the time, and requiring at most 4.7% battery overhead for
the typical user.
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[105] J. A. Adell and P. Jodrá. Exact kolmogorov and total variation distances between some
familiar discrete distributions. Journal of Inequalities and Applications, page 64307, 2006.
[106] T. Parker-Pope. The pedometer test: Americans take fewer steps. http://well.blogs.nytimes.
com/2010/10/19/the-pedometer-test-americans-take-fewer\-steps/? r=0. [Online; accessed
Mar-2015].

98

APPENDICES

99

Appendix A Copyright Permissions

The following is permission to use the content in Chapter 2.

100

Appendix A (Continued)

The following is permission to use the content in Chapter 4.

101

Appendix A (Continued)

The following is permission to use the content in Chapter 4.

102

